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ABSTRACT
Over the past 50 years, campus violence has significantly impacted our
institutions of higher education. As a result, campus safety has become an increasingly
important topic for all colleges and universities. The Virginia Tech tragedy in 2007
highlighted the necessity of emergency management planning and training as well as
employee understanding of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).
Emergency management plans for 27 institutions in Missouri were collected and
evaluated to determine how they instructed employees to respond to various campus
safety scenarios and how training factored into the campus plans. Two-hundred, fifty-one
employees were then surveyed to see how consistently and accurately they responded to
two campus safety scenarios, based on the instructions given in their particular campus
plans. Employee understanding of FERPA was also reviewed to identify how well
administrators, faculty, and staff comprehend student privacy regulations.
The following conclusions were established as a result of this study. (a) While
most institutions have emergency management plans in place, these plans are not well
read or understood. (b) Many emergency management plans are not comprehensive and
are inconsistent across the state of Missouri. (c) Minimal participation in annual training
as part of emergency management planning occurs at our public higher education
institutions in Missouri, especially for faculty. (d) Participation in training does not
indicate that an institution is better prepared to respond to campus safety incidents.
(e) Employees do not understand what information may be shared under FERPA as well
as what information is not subject to FERPA regulations. (f) Some institutions, and some
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individuals, are hesitant to discuss or evaluate emergency preparedness in response to
campus safety incidents.
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW
Introduction
“Knowing what to do when faced with a crisis can be the difference between calm
and chaos, between courage and fear, between life and death” (U.S. Department of
Education, 2007, p. 1-2). This statement from the introduction to the U.S. Department of
Education‟s Practical Information for Crisis Planning reminds us that campus violence is
a reality for institutions of higher education. The days of feeling completely safe and
secure while attending a college or university no longer exist. Although some individuals
still regard higher education institutions as safe havens where nothing bad can happen,
the events of recent years are reminders that our postsecondary institutions must be
prepared for the unthinkable. Colleges and universities must be ready to respond to
incidents of campus violence to ensure the safety of the campus community.
As illustrations of this reality, a number of campus shootings have occurred over
the past 50 years. The University of Texas clock tower attack by former student Charles
Whitman in August of 1966 was considered the nation‟s worst mass shooting up to that
time. A total of 16 people were killed, and another 31 wounded when Mr. Whitman fired
a rifle from the University of Texas-Austin clock tower (Roberts, 2007). Forty-one years
later, the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) tragedy
became the nation‟s worst mass shooting in April of 2007. Seung Hui Cho, an
undergraduate student majoring in English, killed 32 students and faculty, wounded 17
additional people, and then killed himself (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). Despite
these horrific events, the Virginia Tech Review Panel (2007) indicated that “Shootings
at universities are rare events, an average of about 16 a year across 4,000 institutions”
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(p. 18). Yet 16 shootings annually is hardly an acceptable safety record for higher
education and is one that would shock and shame any other developed nation.
The Virginia Tech tragedy brought to light a number of concerns related to
campus safety and emergency preparedness, including concerns about comprehensive
training for faculty, staff, and students and adherence to privacy laws. The Virginia Tech
Review Panel (2007) recommended that training on all types of emergencies be
conducted annually for all faculty, staff, and students. In addition, the Panel expressed
concern about the lack of understanding of privacy laws and the inconsistent practice
when applying privacy laws to college and university security situations.
As a result of incidents like those cited above, most institutions have a
comprehensive emergency management plan in place, which will be referred to in this
study as an all-hazards emergency management plan. One of the most important
components of an all-hazards emergency management plan is training. In the Action
Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education, the U.S.
Department of Education (2009) stated the following:
The more the plan is practiced and people are trained on the plan, the better the
campus responds to emergencies in a comprehensive and effective
manner….Exercises are an effective way to identify gaps and weaknesses in the
plan and to train students, staff, faculty, and campus administrators in the
emergency management procedures. (p. 51)
Although it is important to have a comprehensive plan that covers all hazards, the focus
of this research study is campus violence, which is only one component of an all-hazards
emergency management plan.
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Federal laws, such as the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA),
play a significant role in how administrators, faculty, and staff can plan for and respond
to incidents that may impact campus safety. If suspicious behavior occurs, college
personnel may be forced into a dilemma concerning student right to privacy and
institutional right to safety. The Ripple Effect of Virginia Tech (2008) indicated “The
Virginia Tech tragedy brought into the spotlight the often difficult task of balancing
individual privacy rights with the need to communicate with appropriate authorities when
a student exhibits disturbing or threatening behavior” (Midwestern Higher Education
Compact, p. 13). When faculty and staff are unclear as to how to interpret federal
regulations, institutions of higher education may be at risk.
Purpose of the Study
This research study examined the relationship between active faculty/staff
participation in training exercises as part of implementation of an all-hazards emergency
management plan and the consistency and accuracy of response to potential campus
safety incidents in higher education. The research also reviewed the relationship between
implementation of an all-hazards emergency management plan that includes faculty/staff
participation in training exercises and knowledge of FERPA regulations when responding
to potential campus safety incidents in higher education.
The purpose of this study was to provide research that allows colleges and
universities to determine if training is effective, and if employees who say they have been
trained actually indicate that they know the institution‟s emergency management plan and
would respond appropriately when presented with potential campus safety incidents. The
findings of this study reform the discussion related to the effectiveness of planning and
training in preparing a college community for a violent situation.
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Statement of the Problem
Virtually everyone working in higher education today is aware of the potentiality
of a violent campus incident, and most institutions now have an all-hazards emergency
management plan in place. Yet little research has been performed that examines the
amount of training college employees receive related to the plans, the degree of
understanding faculty and staff have of the requirements of the plans, and the consistency
with which they are understood across campus. Since a plan is no better than an
institution‟s ability to implement it, a plan that is poorly or inconsistently understood will
have limited value in case of a campus emergency. Research is critically needed to
determine how well the myriad of all-hazards emergency management plans have been
assimilated into the culture of the institutions they are designed to protect.
Hypotheses
The following hypotheses guided this research and directed the methodology
employed to acquire and analyze data:
Hypothesis #1: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency
management plan that includes training will respond more consistently to potential
campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions with an allhazards emergency management plan that does not include training.
Hypothesis #2: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency
management plan that includes training will respond more accurately to potential campus
safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards
emergency management plan that does not include training.
Hypothesis #3: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency
management plan that includes training will have more knowledge of FERPA regulations
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when responding to potential campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education
institutions with an all-hazards emergency management plan that does not include
training.
Hypothesis #4: There will be more consistency in response to potential campus safety
incidents by personnel in similar positions at various higher education institutions when
the institutions have all-hazards emergency management plans that include training than
institutions that have all-hazards emergency management plans that do not include
training.
Hypothesis #5: There will be more knowledge of FERPA regulations when responding to
potential campus safety incidents by personnel in similar positions at various higher
education institutions when the institutions have all-hazards emergency management
plans that include training than institutions that have all-hazards emergency management
plans that do not include training.
Hypothesis #6: Personnel in administrative positions at higher education institutions will
respond more accurately to potential campus safety incidents than personnel in nonadministrative positions.
Scope of the Study
A quantitative methodology was employed as a means for both gathering and
analyzing data for this study. Two campus safety incident scenarios were presented to a
group of selected employees at public college campuses in the State of Missouri,
followed by a series of closed-ended questions. The sample population included
presidents, chief academic officers, deans of student services/student affairs, registrars,
full-time faculty members, public safety directors/chiefs of police, public safety officers,
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health/mental health professionals, human resource directors, housing directors, and the
emergency preparedness contact person at each college or university.
The following were delimitations of this research study:
1. This research study was limited to public institutions of higher education in
Missouri.
2. The sample population was limited to the personnel in colleges and universities
selected by the researcher listed above. While others may well be involved in
implementing the plan, this group, by nature of their positions, was seen as critical
to effective execution.
3. Students and adjunct faculty were not included in the sample. Their understanding
of the emergency management plan may be important in a number of ways, but
the focus of this research was on full-time personnel.
Limitations of the Study
This study was limited by several factors that are indicative of characteristics of
both the nature of the study and the institutions involved. Some institutions, especially
community colleges, did not have all participant positions, including health/mental health
professional, housing director, and public safety departments. Additionally, two of the
two-year institutions are part of community college districts and have district
coordinators for the Human Resources and Registrar departments. Two institutions also
did not specifically identify an emergency preparedness contact person, but utilize a
group of individuals to serve in this capacity. In these cases, there were not comparable
responses from each institution.
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The study was further limited by the fact that some institutions did not provide
emergency management plans, and by the vast differences among plans in terms of
completeness. This finding is important to the study because in some cases, it did limit
the ability of the model to compare responses by participants to statements in their
institutional plans.
The researcher does not, however, see these potential limitations as seriously
compromising the study since response rates were sufficient from community colleges,
and very few institutions did not have or did not provide emergency management plans.
Definition of Terms
The following definitions were utilized for important terms and concepts used in
this study to insure clarity and understanding. Some of these definitions are provided to
describe how the researcher used them, specifically in terms of this study.
Accuracy of Response: How accurately higher education personnel respond to personal
and institutional questions following two campus safety incident scenarios that are
presented, based on the institution‟s all-hazards emergency management plan.
Administrator: Full-time employees at public institutions of higher education, including
the following positions: president, chief academic officer, and dean of student
services/student affairs.
All-Hazards Emergency Management Plan: A plan that “develops capacities and
capabilities that are critical to prepare for a full spectrum of emergencies or disasters,
including natural hazards and severe weather, biological hazards, and violence and
terrorism” (U.S. Department of Education, 2009, p. 4).
Campus Violence: “An event, often sudden or unexpected, that disrupts the normal
operations of the institution or its educational mission and threatens the well-being of
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personnel, property, financial resources, and/or reputation of the institution” (Zdziarski,
2006, p. 5).
Consistency of Response: How similarly higher education personnel respond to personal
and institutional questions following two campus safety incident scenarios that are
presented, based on the institution‟s all-hazards emergency management plan.
Faculty: Full-time instructors at public institutions of higher education.
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA): “A federal law that protects the
privacy of students‟ „education records‟….FERPA applies to educational agencies and
institutions that receive funds under any program administered by the U.S. Department of
Education” (U.S. Department of Education/U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 2008, p. 1).
Knowledge of FERPA Regulations: The appropriate response to questions concerning
FERPA.
Mitigation: The phase in institutional emergency management planning that involves “the
action colleges and universities take to eliminate or reduce the loss of life and property
damage related to an event or crisis, particularly those that cannot be prevented”
(U.S. Department of Education, 2009, p. 7).
Preparedness: The phase in institutional emergency management planning that “designs
strategies, processes, and protocols to prepare the college or university for potential
emergencies” (U.S. Department of Education, 2009, p. 9).
Prevention: The phase in institutional emergency management planning that involves
“the action colleges and universities take to decrease the likelihood that an event or crisis
will occur” (U.S. Department of Education, 2009, p. 7).
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Recovery: The phase in institutional emergency management planning that “establishes
procedures, resources, and policies to assist an institution and its members‟ return to
functioning after an emergency” (U.S. Department of Education, 2009, p. 14).
Response: The phase in institutional emergency management planning that involves
“taking action to effectively contain and resolve an emergency” (U.S. Department of
Education, 2009, p. 12).
Staff: Full-time employees at public institutions of higher education, including the
following positions: registrar, public safety director/chief of police, public safety officer,
health/mental health professional, human resource director, housing director, and
emergency preparedness contact person.
Training: Participation in annual training related to campus violence at the institutional
level.
Training Exercises: Orientation meetings, tabletop exercises, drills, functional exercises,
and/or full-scale exercises (U.S. Department of Education, 2009).
Significance of the Study
Campus violence is a topic that is familiar to all. Whether a loved one has been
lost or the impact of a tragedy has been felt from miles away, campus violence is a reality
for all Americans. For the safety of faculty, staff, and students, institutions of higher
education must be proactive in preparing for potential incidents of campus violence. This
study researched the importance of having an all-hazards emergency management plan in
place which is supplemented by regular training exercises for all faculty and staff. Its
findings reform the discussion related to the effectiveness of planning and training in
preparing a college community for a violent situation. Additionally, the importance of
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understanding FERPA regulations was reviewed, and the study determined how well
informed the participant community is about these important regulations.
When this research study was undertaken, it was determined that if the results of
this research study indicated there was a significant relationship between implementation
of an all-hazards emergency management plan that includes faculty/staff participation in
training exercises and (a) consistency of response to potential campus safety incidents
within an institution, (b) accuracy of response to potential campus safety incidents within
an institution, and (c) knowledge of FERPA regulations when responding to potential
campus safety incidents within an institution, then colleges and universities should
commence and/or update training exercises at their respective institutions as soon as
possible. All faculty and staff should be required to participate in training exercises.
If the results did not indicate a significant relationship between implementation of
an all-hazards emergency management plan that includes faculty/staff participation in
training exercises and consistency of response, accuracy of response, and knowledge of
FERPA regulations when responding to potential campus safety incidents within an
institution, then further research should be conducted to determine what influences
consistency and accuracy of response and knowledge of FERPA regulations within
higher education institutions and how training and institutional responsiveness can be
made more effective.
Additionally, it was determined that if the results indicated there was a significant
relationship between implementation of an all-hazards emergency management plan that
includes faculty/staff participation in training exercises and consistency of response to
potential campus safety incidents by personnel in similar positions at various higher
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education institutions and knowledge of FERPA regulations, but a clear difference in
levels of knowledge and understanding between positions, then colleges and universities
should commence and/or update training exercises at their respective institutions as soon
as possible. All faculty and staff should be required to participate in these training
exercises. If the results of this research study indicated there was not a significant
relationship between implementation of an all-hazards emergency management plan that
includes faculty/staff participation in training exercises and these two factors, then further
research should be conducted to determine what influences consistency of response and
knowledge of FERPA regulations among personnel in similar positions at various higher
education institutions.
The same can be said of accuracy of response. After conducting this study, if
personnel in similar positions responded more accurately than others, training must be
revised to increase levels of understanding for those groups who demonstrated lower
levels of knowledge. If the results of this research study indicated there was not a
significant relationship between personnel in administrative positions responding more
accurately to potential campus safety incidents than personnel in non-administrative
positions, then further research should be conducted to ensure that all personnel are
responding accurately to potential campus safety incidents.
In the State of Missouri where this research was conducted, the Higher Education
Subcommittee of the state‟s Homeland Security Advisory Council is encouraging
statewide training. If this research study finds that faculty/staff participation in training
exercises is significantly related to consistency and accuracy of response and knowledge
of FERPA regulations, then this study supports statewide efforts to promote the
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importance of training the campus community and will encourage further professional
development efforts.
Summary
Campus violence is a reality for institutions of higher education. Colleges and
universities must be proactive in educating and training the campus community for
potential campus safety incidents. This chapter provided an overview of the growth in
campus violence and outlines a study that examines the effectiveness of training when
included in college and university emergency management plans. Six hypotheses were
presented that suggest that a relationship will exist between the amount of training an
employee receives and the consistency and accuracy with which each person will respond
to a crisis situation, as called for in the institution‟s emergency management plan. The
scope of the study, limitations, definition of terms, and significance of the study were
reviewed.
The following chapters provide additional foundation for this research study.
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the literature that is pertinent to campus violence and
emergency preparedness but indicates deficiencies in the existing body of knowledge
concerning the effects of planning on employee response. It demonstrates that although
campus preparedness has become an issue of great concern, too little has been done to
evaluate familiarity with the institution‟s emergency management plan and individual
responsiveness. Chapter 3 provides details on the methodology that was used for this
research study, and Chapter 4 provides a review of the findings. The final chapter,
Chapter 5, analyzes these findings, makes recommendations for better and more effective
institutional planning and response to campus crises, and suggests other areas of research
that will address additional gaps in the body of literature.
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITEATURE
Introduction
“Educational institutions are no longer viewed as safe havens for students,
faculty, or staff. Violence is a community and societal problem that has found its way
into institutions of higher education” (Schuh, 1998, p. 347). This quote from Violence on
Campus: Defining the Problems, Strategies for Action demonstrates the critical need for
additional research about both campus crime and the plans and activities being developed
by postsecondary institutions to prevent and minimize it. As a prelude to describing such
a study, this chapter provides a brief summary of the literature related to campus violence
at institutions of higher education, the four phases of emergency management, the
creation of threat assessment teams, the importance of an all-hazards emergency
management plan, the significance of training exercises, the Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act (FERPA), and the Clery Act.
Campus Violence at Institutions of Higher Education
Over the past 50 years, college and university campuses have become the sites of
a series of fatal shootings that have changed forever our understanding of campus
security. The University of Texas shooting by former student Charles Whitman was
considered the nation‟s worst mass shooting when it occurred in August of 1966. Mr.
Whitman, an abused child and former Marine, killed 16 people and wounded another 31,
when he fired a rifle from the University of Texas-Austin clock tower for 96 minutes. In
a written note, Mr. Whitman blamed his father for his actions (Macleod, 2009; Roberts,
2007). Twenty-five years later, in November of 1991, Gang Lu, a student who had
recently completed his doctoral degree, went on a shooting rampage at the University of
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Iowa. Mr. Lu was upset that he had not received an award for his dissertation and fatally
shot three professors who served on his dissertation committee as well as a vice president
and her receptionist before killing himself (Marriott, 1991).
The next major incident occurred during a student‟s thesis defense in August of
1996. Frederick Martin Davidson, a former soldier, was a graduate student in engineering
at San Diego State University. Mr. Davidson deeply resented three of his engineering
professors and fatally shot these professors during his defense (Nash, 2004). In August of
2000, James Easton Kelly, a graduate student at the University of Arkansas, was
dismissed from the Comparative Literature program. Mr. Kelly went to campus and
killed his advisor, who was also the chair of the committee that denied his reinstatement
to the graduate program, and then killed himself (CBS News, 2000). Two years later,
Peter Odighizuwa, a student who flunked out of Appalachian School of Law, went on a
January shooting spree, killing the Dean of the law school, one professor, and one student
and injured three other students before he was restrained by students (CNN, 2002). A few
months later in October of 2002, Robert Flores, a nursing student at the University of
Arizona, killed three of his professors and then committed suicide. Mr. Flores, an Army
veteran who had many personal problems, was taking revenge on his professors for
failing him (Smallwood, 2002). On a campus visit to Shepherd University in September
of 2006, Douglas Pennington, a man who was being treated for mental illness, killed his
two sons and then committed suicide (Marcum, 2010).
Forty-one years after the University of Texas mass shooting, the Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) tragedy became the nation‟s
worst mass shooting in April of 2007. Seung Hui Cho, an undergraduate student majoring
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in English who had a history of mental health concerns and disturbing behaviors, killed
32 students and faculty, wounded 17 additional people, and then killed himself (Virginia
Tech Review Panel, 2007). Less than a year later, two shootings occurred in February of
2008. On February 8, Latina Williams, a nursing student, killed two students and then
herself at Louisiana Technical College. No connections were found between Ms.
Williams and her two victims (Fox News, 2008; Hoover, 2008). On February 14, Stephen
Kazmierczak, a former Northern Illinois University student who was currently enrolled in
graduate studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, walked into an
introductory geology class, killed five students, and injured 16 others at Northern Illinois
University before committing suicide. Mr. Kazmierczak was discharged from the Army
for psychological issues, had spent time in a psychiatric facility, and had quit taking his
medicine (Friedman, 2008; Heinzmann, et al., 2008). In December of 2009, James
Hamilton, a student at Northern Virginia Community College with a history of mental
health problems, attempted to shoot his math teacher because he was failing her class.
After firing two shots and attempting a third, Mr. Hamilton left the classroom, sat on a
chair in the hallway, and calmly waited for the police to arrive (Barakat, 2011; Urbina,
2009).
In 2010, campus violence assumed a different face at our colleges and universities
as college employees became the perpetrators of crime. In March of 2010, a custodian at
Ohio State University by the name of Nathaniel Brown was distraught over the
impending loss of his job and his home. Mr. Brown killed one of his supervisors and
injured another employee (10TV, 2010). A few months later in August, a biology faculty
member at the University of Alabama-Huntsville opened fire during a biology faculty
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meeting. Amy Bishop had been denied tenure and fatally shot three biology professors
and injured two other professors and an assistant (Wheaton and Dewan, 2010).
The University of Texas-Austin was again the victim of campus violence in
September of 2010. Colton Tooley, a math major who was dressed in a business suit and
a ski mask, fired several rounds into the air while running through campus before
committing suicide (Goldman, 2010). Teachers, family members, and friends were
shocked at Mr. Tooley‟s behavior. There was little explanation for his actions. He was
known as kind, quiet, and intelligent, not someone who would commit such a violent act
(Gay, 2010). One month later, Christopher Amyx, a student at Mid-Atlantic Christian
University who was a part-time police officer, shot another student during an argument in
the dormitories. Mr. Amyx claimed he had been receiving threats and fired his weapon in
self defense (CBN News, 2010; “Part-Time Cop Charged,” 2010). These incidents
demonstrate our long and continuing history of campus violence and emphasize the need
for institutions of higher education to be prepared to respond to potential campus safety
incidents.
Phases of Emergency Management
Partially in response to the high profile incidents mentioned at the beginning of
this chapter, emergency management has become a familiar term to all institutions of
higher education. The days of feeling completely safe and secure on the college campus
no longer exist. To assist institutions in preparing for campus emergencies, the U.S.
Department of Education and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) issued
in 2009 an action guide which outlines four phases of emergency management
preparation and response. These phases include prevention-mitigation, preparedness,
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response, and recovery. All of the phases are related to one another and build on the
previous phase (FEMA, 1996). A brief overview of each phase of emergency
management follows.
Prevention-Mitigation
Prevention-Mitigation is the first phase in emergency management. According to
the U.S. Department of Education (2009), “Prevention is the action colleges and
universities take to decrease the likelihood that an event or crisis will occur” (p. 7).
“Mitigation is the action colleges and universities take to eliminate or reduce the loss of
life and property damage related to an event or crisis, particularly those that cannot be
prevented” (p. 7). Mitigation also includes educating individuals to reduce the possibility
of incidents occurring. Mitigation is designed to make campuses safer; however, it does
not remove all threats from a campus (FEMA, 1996). The components of preventionmitigation include analyzing data on the campus community, such as campus crime data
and campus vulnerability data; examining the facilities and grounds of each campus to
identify vulnerabilities; and evaluating the culture and climate of the campus community
(U.S. Department of Education, 2009).
Preparedness
Preparedness is the second phase in emergency management. “The Preparedness
phase designs strategies, processes, and protocols to prepare the college or university for
potential emergencies” (U.S. Department of Education, 2009, p. 9). The components of
preparedness include developing a command center to activate if an emergency occurs,
creating policies and procedures in collaboration with community partners, and
partnering with the community to create formal agreements. Another important
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component is developing contracts to provide the campus community with necessary
resources, such as food and transportation, in the event of an emergency. Identifying the
chain of command in an emergency situation and developing detailed plans to ensure that
the campus will continue to function in the event of an emergency are essential in the
preparedness phase. There must also be a plan to unite faculty, staff, and students with
their family members and an emergency communication plan must be developed for
keeping the campus community and media informed. Additionally, it is important to
organize emergency management plans with state and local agencies and develop plans to
train faculty, staff, and students on emergency preparedness. Collaboration with mental
health professionals to develop a procedure for identifying and evaluating at-risk
individuals is important in the preparedness phase. Finally, institutions must ensure
compliance with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act and the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (U.S. Department of Education, 2009).
Response
Response is the third phase in emergency management. According to the U.S.
Department of Education (2009), “Response is taking action to effectively contain and
resolve an emergency” (p. 12). The more comprehensive the prevention-mitigation and
preparedness phases, the more effective the response will be. The components of
response include activating the emergency management plan; communicating with
community partners and the campus community, including the media; and identifying the
plan for response (U.S. Department of Education, 2009).
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Recovery
Recovery is the fourth phase in emergency management. “The Recovery phase
establishes procedures, resources, and policies to assist an institution and its members‟
return to functioning after an emergency” (U.S. Department of Education, 2009, p. 14).
Recovery time will vary depending on the emergency situation and is considered an
ongoing process. Institutions start planning for the recovery phase during the
preparedness phase, and it is essential for the leadership team to be involved. The
components of recovery include recovery of the physical and structural components,
recovery of the business operations, re-establishment of the academic environment, and
assistance with individual psychological/emotional needs (U.S. Department of Education,
2009). Since institutions will be learning during this phase, recovery should also include
mitigation as part of its process (FEMA, 1996).
The focus of this research study is on the preparedness phase of emergency
management. Two of the most important components of preparedness include developing
and regularly reviewing an all-hazards emergency management plan and engaging faculty
and staff in training exercises based on the emergency management plan.
After the tragedy at Virginia Tech, many states conducted a comprehensive
review of their emergency management procedures. The findings were consistent across
most of these reports. Institutions need to: (a) create and maintain up-to-date and
comprehensive emergency management plans, (b) conduct training on emergency
management plans with the campus community on a regular basis, (c) provide guidance
and clarification on FERPA, (d) implement notification systems for campus emergencies,
(e) create threat assessment teams, and (f) increase access to mental health services
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(Florida Gubernatorial Task Force for University Campus Safety, 2007; Illinois Campus
Security Task Force, 2008; Missouri Campus Security Task Force, 2007; National
Association of Attorneys General Task Force on School and Campus Safety, 2007; New
Mexico Governor‟s Task Force on Campus Safety, 2007; North Carolina Campus Safety
Task Force, 2008; Oklahoma‟s Campus Life and Safety and Security Task Force, 2008;
O‟Neill, Fox, Depue, & Englander, Massachusetts Higher Education, 2008; Pennsylvania
State Police Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Team, 2007; State of Wisconsin
Governor‟s Task Force on Campus Safety, 2007; Task Force on Ohio College Campus
Safety and Security, 2007). While all of the findings are important for institutions of
higher education, the focus of this study was on emergency management planning,
training, and FERPA regulations. However, it is important to understand how colleges
and universities have increased their efforts to prevent campus violence as a result of the
Virginia Tech tragedy.
Threat Assessment Teams
As noted above, many states have recommended that their institutions create
threat assessment teams. These teams are designed as a prevention tool to identify
troubled and potentially dangerous students and/or employees (Cornell, 2010). Teams are
referred to by various names, including Threat Assessment Team (TAT); Behavioral
Intervention Team (BIT); Behavioral Assessment Team (BAT); Students of Concern
(SOC); Campus Assessment, Response, Evaluation (CARE); College Concerns Team
(CCT); Threat Assessment and Behavioral Intervention (TABI); and Campus Assessment
Team (CAT) (Sokolow and Lewis, n.d.). For the purposes of this research, the teams will
be referred to as threat assessment teams.
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The team should consist of representatives from the following areas:
administrators, law enforcement/campus safety, mental health/counseling, faculty,
student services, legal counsel, housing, and human resources. The team should have
power to investigate disruptive or threatening behaviors and act accordingly.
Additionally, team members must have a good working relationship and establish trust
among one another (Cornell, 2010; Florida Gubernatorial Task Force for University
Campus Safety, 2007; Fox and Savage, 2009; Illinois Campus Security Task Force, 2008;
Missouri Campus Security Task Force, 2007; O‟Neill, Fox, Depue, & Englander,
Massachusetts Higher Education, 2008).
As a result of the Cho shootings, the state legislature in Virginia mandated all
public higher education institutions implement a threat assessment team. Cornell (2010)
indicated “The history of many school shootings reveals that the attack was preceded by
threatening statements and behavior that aroused the concern of others weeks or months
in advance” (p. 10). Threat assessment specifically focuses on individuals who have
exhibited behavior of concern or expressed threatening remarks. The goal of the threat
assessment team is to determine if the threat is serious and the individual poses a risk to
the campus community (Cornell, 2010). There are four steps in threat assessment used by
the higher education institutions in Virginia as Figure 1 illustrates.
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Figure 1. Virginia Threat Assessment Decision-Tree.
From “Threat Assessment in College Settings,” by D. Cornell, 2010, Change 42(1), p. 12. Reprinted with permission of
the author.

First, the teams need to identify a threat. This step involves educating the campus
community to communicate any behavioral concerns or threatening remarks that are
known to the threat assessment team. This was identified as one of the main weaknesses
at Virginia Tech. Many individuals across campus had concerns about Seung Hui Cho;
however, the concerns were not shared with one central team that could have identified
the risk that Mr. Cho posed (Cornell, 2010). Campus Violence Prevention and Response:
Best Practices for Massachusetts Higher Education (2008) identified the necessity of
faculty members to report any students who exhibit disturbing or concerning behaviors
through their writings and drawings. The Campus Safety Task Force in Wisconsin (2007)
stressed the importance of reporting repeated classroom incidents of disruptive behavior,
threats, stalking, and harassment to the threat assessment team. Additionally, the Florida
Gubernatorial Task Force for University Campus Safety (2007) stated the importance of
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educating faculty, staff, and students on identifying the various warning signs and
submitting referrals to the threat assessment team.
The second step involves research and focuses on evaluating how serious the
threat is. The threat assessment team may use the continuum in Figure 2 to identify the
level of threat that an individual poses. At one end of the spectrum, an individual may
have made a statement in jest that was never intended to hurt anyone. On the other hand,
someone could have communicated their desire to seriously harm individuals. If no
concerns are found in this step, the issue may be resolved (Cornell, 2010).

Figure 2. Continuum of Threats.
From “Threat Assessment in College Settings,” by D. Cornell, 2010, Change 42(1), p. 13. Reprinted with permission of
the author.

The Virginia Tech Review Panel (2007) stated “It is essential that this [Threat
Assessment] Team be charged with building a complete fact-based picture of any
individual who is considered a risk to him or herself or to the campus community”
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(p. 15). Discussion must occur with various individuals who know the person of concern.
The State of Wisconsin Governor‟s Task Force on Campus Safety (2007) recommended
speaking with individuals who are close to the person of concern, such as faculty,
roommates, or housing employees, to evaluate the threat. Individuals may shed light on
the student‟s behavior or other concerns. Teams must be careful to review the context in
which the threats or disturbing behavior occurred. It is important to consider all details
before determining the seriousness of the threat. While behavior may be disturbing, it
may prove harmless (Fox and Savage, 2009).
Once the team has determined the seriousness of the threat, they may intervene to
reduce the likelihood that violence will occur. This may involve notifying potential
victims, recommending counseling for the person of concern, or in severe cases, legal
action may need to be taken against the person of concern, such as a restraining order
(Cornell, 2010). The Virginia Tech Review Panel expressed the importance of the threat
assessment team to “recommend significant and timely interventions to ensure the safety
of the individual and others in the campus community” (2007, pp. 15-16). The State of
Illinois Campus Security Task Force (2008) identified the importance of the team‟s
ability to provide or refer the student to the appropriate resources in a timely manner.
Most individuals are experiencing mental health issues prior to their incidents of campus
violence, including the potential for suicide (Deisinger, 2009).
Finally, it is essential that the threat assessment team continually reviews and
monitors each situation to ensure that all parties are safe. This step may involve keeping a
record of the case and asking the individuals involved to contact the team if any concerns
arise. If the situation involved a threat or concern between two or more individuals, the
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team may want to periodically follow up with all parties involved in the case to ensure
safety. For the most serious matters, a case should remain open and be continually
reviewed to identify any concerns. Records should be maintained even after a student
graduates in the event another incident occurs (Cornell, 2010). For example, Peter
Odighizuwa was a former student at Appalachian School of Law, and Stephen
Kazmierczak formerly attended Northern Illinois University prior to their incidents of
campus violence at these institutions (CNN, 2002; Friedman, 2008).
The following statements by Peter Lake summarize the importance of
implementing threat assessment teams at all colleges and universities and educating the
campus community to report students who exhibit disturbing or threatening behavior.
Most important, dangerous people rarely show all of their symptoms to just one
department or group on campus. A professor may see a problem in an essay, the
campus police may endure belligerent statements, a resident assistant may notice
the student is a loner, the counseling center may notice that the student fails to
appear for a follow-up visit. Acting independently, no department is likely to
solve the problem. In short, colleges must recognize that managing an educational
environment is a team effort, calling for collaboration and multilateral solutions.
(2007, p. 5)
All-Hazards Emergency Management Plan
While this research study focuses specifically on campus violence, it is important
for colleges and universities to consider taking an “all-hazards approach” to planning.
According to the U.S. Department of Education (2009), “All-hazards planning develops
capacities and capabilities that are critical to prepare for a full spectrum of emergencies
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or disasters, including natural hazards and severe weather, biological hazards, and
violence and terrorism” (p. 4). As a result of the variety of tragedies that have occurred at
colleges and universities across the country, from crimes of the type listed above, to
hurricane destruction, to tornados and flooding, an all-hazards approach has become
standard (Illinois Campus Security Task Force, 2008; Missouri Campus Safety Task
Force, 2007; O‟Neill, et al., Massachusetts Higher Education, 2008; Pennsylvania State
Police Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Team, 2007). Jack Watring, chief of police at
the University of Missouri-Columbia, supported the all-hazards approach when he stated,
“We need to know what to do if there‟s an active shooter, a natural disaster, a fire, an
evacuation, tornados or floods; we need to know how to handle it” (Kennedy, 2008,
p. 13).
Many scholars have emphasized the importance of institutional preparedness
through development of a comprehensive emergency management plan. Rollo and
Zdziarski (2007) identified the emergency management plan as “perhaps the single most
important crisis management tool a campus can have” (p. 74). The plan is the foundation
that an institution of higher education will use to perform its operations. A written plan
provides clear and consistent guidelines regarding how an institution will respond to an
emergency and aids in avoiding confusion during the response (Rollo and Zdziarski,
2007).
In a review conducted in Massachusetts to identify best practices across the
United States for dealing with crisis situations, higher education officials reviewed 20
reports from task forces and study groups. The number one recommendation resulting
from this review was to develop an all-hazards emergency management plan (O‟Neill,
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et al., Massachusetts Higher Education, 2008). An emergency management plan should
be in place prior to an incident of campus violence. As stated in the U.S. Department of
Education‟s Practical Information on Crisis Planning (2007), “A crisis is the time to
follow the crisis plan, not to make a plan from scratch” (p. 4-1).
While having a comprehensive emergency management plan is important, it is
even more critical to ensure that the plan meets the needs of the institution and is up-todate. Kennedy (2007) noted, “The Virginia Tech massacre demonstrates the difference
between having a plan and having the right plan” (p. 12). The Virginia Tech Review
Panel (2007) found that Virginia Tech‟s emergency management plan was lacking in a
variety of areas. One of the biggest deficiencies was that the plan did not include
information related to shootings. The plan was also approximately two years old at the
time of the Seung Hui Cho shootings and had not been updated during that period.
Another important component of an emergency management plan is to ensure that
the plan is reviewed on a regular basis. Zdziarski (2006) stated, “Simply having a written
plan and crisis protocols is not enough; to be well prepared, you should review and
update them regularly….Best practices suggest an annual review” (p. 20). A review of
the literature indicates that prior to the Virginia Tech incident, many institutions had not
reviewed their emergency management plans with this frequency. Zdziarski (2001) found
in his dissertation study that of the higher education institutions that reported having
university crisis management plans, 56% indicated that their university plans were
reviewed on an annual basis, 24% reported reviewing their plans every three years, 4%
indicated a review of their plans occurred every five years, and 16% responded “other.”
Campus security incidents following Zdziarski‟s 2001 study appear to have prompted
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more frequent review. The National Campus Safety and Security Project Survey (2008)
found that 89% of participants reported that their emergency management plans were
updated annually or continually revised as necessary, and 7% of participants advised that
their plans were revised on a two to three year cycle. The Florida Gubernatorial Task
Force for University Campus Safety (2007) recommended that emergency management
plans at colleges and universities be reviewed on a quarterly basis accelerating the cycle.
The Virginia Tech Review Panel (2007) indicated that most colleges and universities
have reviewed their emergency management plans since the tragedy at Virginia Tech.
An all-hazards emergency management plan that is comprehensive, current, and
relevant is essential for institutions of higher education. Regular review of the emergency
management plan is also necessary to ensure accurate information but must be
accompanied by good training.
Training
The literature published by agencies responsible for promoting and encouraging
campus safety stresses the importance of training exercises if a campus is to be
appropriately prepared (International Association of Campus Law Enforcement
Administrators, 2008; National Association of Attorneys General Task Force on School
and Campus Safety, 2007; U.S. Department of Education, 2009; Virginia Tech Review
Panel, 2007). The U.S. Department of Education (2007) indicated that training is
essential in order to successfully implement an emergency management plan. Faculty and
staff need to understand their responsibilities and expectations during a campus
emergency if they are to respond appropriately (Zdziarski, 2006). Training also provides
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the opportunity to identify concerns with the emergency management plan. According to
the U.S. Department of Education (2009):
The more the plan is practiced and people are trained on the plan, the better the
campus responds to emergencies in a comprehensive and effective
manner….Exercises are an effective way to identify gaps and weaknesses in the
plan and to train students, staff, faculty, and campus administrators in the
emergency management procedures. (p. 51)
In addition, it is important to engage participants in training exercises so that each
respondent has actively practiced the actions to be taken. Wilson (2007) stated that
“Training is best when it is active and engaging, not lecture-based. Participants should be
extensively involved – thinking, talking, practicing, revising, and evaluating” (p. 189).
There are a variety of exercises that institutions of higher education may conduct,
including orientation meetings, tabletop exercises, drills, functional exercises, and fullscale exercises. Practicing and training with community partners is highly recommended
(U.S. Department of Education, 2009).
Orientation meetings provide the opportunity to discuss the emergency
management plan with the campus community. Tabletop exercises allow individuals to
discuss a scenario and how the institution would prepare for the emergency, respond to
the emergency, and recover from the emergency (U.S. Department of Education, 2009).
These exercises are inexpensive and provide the opportunity for hypothetical emergency
situations in a less stressful environment (Wilson, 2007). The scenarios presented to
participants in this research study are similar to what might be used in a tabletop exercise.
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Drills include a limited number of campus staff and community partners working
together to respond to a scenario. Functional exercises are comparable to drills but
involve numerous campus staff and community partners. Individuals respond to a
simulated event using the emergency management plan and procedures. Full-scale
exercises are very time-consuming and involve multiple agencies and jurisdictions. These
exercises use all available resources and examine the collaboration among all individuals
and systems (U.S. Department of Education, 2009). Full-scale exercises may also be
referred to as simulation exercises. These exercises require much coordination and
planning between agencies but provide the opportunity for a realistic version of what may
occur during an emergency and allow an institution to see if its emergency management
plan works effectively (Zdziarski, 2006).
The need to perform training exercises and educate the campus community has
grown in importance as a result of the tragedies that have occurred. In a follow up
research study to Zdziarski‟s 2001 dissertation, Catullo (2008) found a significant change
in training exercises performed. While 16.4% of institutions reported the use of tabletop
exercises in 2001, 59.2% of institutions reported their use in 2007. In addition, while 26%
of institutions reported the use of crisis simulations or drills in 2001, 50.7% reported their
use in 2007.
As with updating of the emergency management plan, training must occur on a
regular basis. The Virginia Tech tragedy has impacted the frequency with which training
exercises are performed. More tabletop exercises, using the Virginia Tech scenario, are
now being performed (Kennedy, 2008). The New Mexico Governor‟s Task Force on
Campus Safety (2007) recommended that exercises occur at least on an annual basis, with
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full-scale exercises occurring at least every three years. The Virginia Tech Presidential
Internal Review (2007) advised that much time and attention had been devoted to training
the campus community regarding campus violence at Virginia Tech but may not have
been recent enough to seem relevant. “Because individuals tend to process information
that they judge to be relevant to them, they may ignore policy and procedures related to
campus violence until they need them, which is often too late” (p. 19).
A common concern with emergency preparedness is employee turnover.
Ensuring that all faculty and staff are trained can be difficult since new faculty and staff
are employed each year (Missouri Campus Security Task Force, 2007; Virginia Tech
Presidential Internal Review, 2007). Oklahoma‟s Campus Life and Safety and Security
Task Force (2008) suggested that training be required for all new faculty and staff, and
that training should be provided on a regular basis as a refresher for all employees.
Institutions need to determine which type(s) of training exercises will be most
effective for their employees. The U.S. Department of Education (2009) indicated the
following in relation to training exercises:
Before making a decision about which type of exercise to facilitate, a higher
education institution should consider varying factors, including the amount of
time and resources and collaborative support required to execute the activity
balanced against the outcome of the experience. For example, while a tabletop
exercise may be cheaper and less time-consuming to run, a full-scale exercise
provides a more realistic context for the simulated response to an emergency
situation, thus providing more constructive feedback to implement into plans.
(p. 52)
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Due to the importance of being prepared for campus violence, some states feel
that emergency preparedness should be tied to accreditation and state funding. The
Florida Gubernatorial Task Force for University Campus Safety (2007) recommended
that campus safety be tied to the accreditation process. The National Association of
Attorneys General Task Force on School and Campus Safety (2007) recommended that
states should think about mandating that all colleges and universities participate in
training exercises at least annually as a requirement to receive state funding.
Northern Illinois University‟s (NIU) response to its campus shooting in 2008
demonstrated that well prepared campuses respond better to campus emergencies. In
many ways, NIU was much better prepared to respond to the campus shooting incident
than Virginia Tech. For example, NIU had an up-to-date and comprehensive emergency
management plan in place, along with regular training. NIU did not wait until the
Virginia Tech tragedy to create its emergency management plan; NIU began preparing its
campus in 2001. A report on the NIU shooting indicated, “These efforts proved critical
and life saving in the effective response and follow-up surrounding the February 14
shooting” (Northern Illinois University, 2008, p. xvi). On the other hand, Virginia Tech
had an emergency management plan that was about two years old and did not include
response to a campus shooting incident. Faculty, staff, and students had not been trained
on this type of incident and were not familiar with the protocol for responding on April
16, 2007 (Northern Illinois University, 2008; Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007).
Additionally, NIU had in place a threat assessment team to discuss any potential
concerns that may arise on campus. However, NIU had no reason to suspect that Stephen
Kazmierczak had mental health issues. In contrast, Virginia Tech did not have a threat
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assessment team in place at the time of its tragedy. Virginia Tech had a “Care Team”
which was not effective in addressing the multiple issues that had occurred with Cho,
both inside and outside of the classroom. The campus community did not share
information with one another or Cho‟s parents and expressed concern that they did not
believe they could share information under FERPA. In the NIU incident, the university
immediately locked down the campus when it learned of the shooting and provided
updates to the campus community. However, Virginia Tech did not notify its campus in a
timely manner that a campus emergency had occurred and did not lock down the campus
(Northern Illinois University, 2008; Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007).
Under the current state of readiness in the United States, we do not know the level
of preparedness from one campus to another. Individual states do not know if the higher
education institutions are ready to respond. The purpose of this study was to determine
how well prepared employees are to respond to campus safety incidents, based on
evidence that there is still little indication that employees understand emergency
management plans and can respond appropriately to campus violence.
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) deals specifically with
the privacy of education records at secondary and post-secondary institutions that receive
U.S. Department of Education funds and has important implications for crisis
management. Student education records are records that are “directly related to a student”
and maintained by an institution (Hicks, Baker, Hawkey, Myers, & Weese, 2006, p. viii).
FERPA grants four specific rights to students regarding their education records: the right
to inspect their records, the right to request amendment to their records, the right to
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consent to disclosure of their records, and the right to make a complaint with the U.S.
Department of Education if they suspect these other provisions are violated (Hicks, et al.,
2006).
FERPA became a significant issue in the Virginia Tech tragedy because a variety
of incidents occurred that could have been reported regarding Seung Hui Cho‟s behavior
prior to the fatal shootings. For example, a number of Cho‟s professors and staff from
Residence Life observed questionable conduct by Cho. Under FERPA, professors and
staff had the authority to contact Cho‟s parents, but they were not clear about this right.
When behavior of this type is observed, college employees are often hesitant to make
these contacts, however, since they understand FERPA to prohibit discussion with
parents about student activity. The Virginia Tech Review Panel (2007) indicated the
following:
Nothing in FERPA prohibits a school official from sharing with parents
information that is based on that official‟s personal knowledge or observation and
that is not based on information contained in an education record. Therefore,
FERPA would not prohibit a teacher or other school official from letting a parent
know of their concern about their son or daughter that is based on their personal
knowledge or observation. (p. H-7)
It was also the case that when the police department at Virginia Tech received complaints
regarding Cho‟s behavior, FERPA did not prohibit them from releasing this information
to Cho‟s parents (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). Records that are made and
maintained for law enforcement purposes only are not subject to FERPA (Hicks, et al.,
2006).
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The Virginia Tech Review Panel (2007) stated “Information privacy laws are
intended to strike a balance between protecting privacy and allowing information sharing
that is necessary or desirable. Because of this difficult balance, the laws are often
complex and hard to understand” (p. 63). The Review Panel expressed concern about the
lack of understanding of FERPA and the inconsistent practice when applying privacy
laws. The Review Panel proposed that amendments be made to FERPA, specifically
related to the emergency exception, and recommended that the Department of Education
provide additional flexibility in the emergency exception of FERPA.
Effective January 8, 2009, the Department of Education implemented updated
FERPA regulations. One of the updates included the emergency exception to FERPA,
which states:
An educational agency or institution may disclose personally identifiable
information from an education record to appropriate parties, including parents of
an eligible student, in connection with an emergency if knowledge of the
information is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or other
individuals….An educational agency or institution may take into account the
totality of the circumstances pertaining to a threat to the health or safety of a
student or other individuals. If the educational agency or institution determines
that there is an articulable and significant threat to the health or safety of a student
or other individuals, it may disclose information from education records to any
person whose knowledge of the information is necessary to protect the health or
safety of the student or other individuals. If, based on the information available at
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the time of the determination, there is a rational basis for the determination, the
Department will not substitute its judgment for that of the educational agency or
institution in evaluating the circumstances and making its determination.
(FERPA, 2008, p. 74854)
FERPA, as a subject, can be very disconcerting to faculty and staff at institutions
of higher education. While there is more definitive language as to when an institution
may release confidential student information, the views are still subjective. However, in
the wake of Virginia Tech and other campus tragedies, employees must use their
discretion to protect the campus community. One of the purposes of this study was to
determine how well informed college employees are of their rights under FERPA and of
the flexibility the law provides in situations that may lead to a campus emergency.
Clery Act
The Clery Act is a federal law that mandates colleges and universities to provide
information on campus crimes and security policies annually. Formerly known as the
Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act of 1990, this law was established in memory
of Jeanne Ann Clery who was raped and murdered in her college dormitory in 1986. All
higher education institutions who receive federal financial aid must comply with this law.
The Clery Act requires colleges and universities to perform the following: (a) annually
disclose a report that includes the past three years of campus crime statistics and policies
on campus security; (b) publish institutional crime statistics for seven categories of crime,
including homicide, sex offenses, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, vehicle theft, and
arson; (c) issue “timely warnings” when a serious threat is posed to students and
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employees; and (d) produce a crime log available for public review (Security on Campus,
Inc., 2008).
After the nation‟s worst mass shootings in April of 2007, there was much debate
about Virginia Tech‟s failure to notify the campus community in a timely manner that a
gunman was on campus. A warning was issued two hours after the first shootings
occurred at Virginia Tech. Administrators claimed that they believed a domestic incident
had occurred and that the campus community was not at risk (Potter, 2010). However, the
U.S. Department of Education stated, “Virginia Tech‟s failure to issue timely warnings
about the serious and ongoing threat deprived its students and employees of vital, timesensitive information and denied them the opportunity to take adequate steps to provide
for their own safety” (Potter, 2010, p. 1). Virginia Tech was fined the maximum penalty
of $55,000 for its negligence, including $27,500 for failure to notify the campus in a
timely manner and $27,500 for not following the policy on timely warnings (Anderson
and Shapira, 2011).
As a result of the Virginia Tech tragedy, the Higher Education Opportunity Act
amended the Clery Act in 2008 by adding a statement on emergency procedures. When
publicly disclosing security policies, an institution will “immediately notify the campus
community upon the confirmation of a significant emergency or dangerous situation
involving an immediate threat to the health or safety of students or staff” (Security on
Campus, Inc., 2008, p. 1).
The Clery Act has been in existence for over 20 years. Higher education
institutions are increasingly being held accountable for their response to campus safety
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incidents and have been publicly scrutinized for failure to maintain compliance with the
provisions of the Clery Act.
Summary
The literature reports the growing number of campus violence incidents that have
occurred at colleges and universities across the United States over the past 50 years. It
stresses how unprepared Virginia Tech was to respond to the nation‟s worst mass
shootings in 2007. The literature also illustrates that though much has been written about
emergency management plans and how often they are reviewed, we know little about
how well they are understood or could be followed at colleges and universities.
Additionally, the literature stresses the importance of understanding FERPA but does
little to indicate how well employees are educated in its nuances.
This chapter provided an overview of the literature that is pertinent to campus
violence, emergency preparedness, and this research study. The relevant topics included a
brief history of campus violence incidents in the United States, four phases of emergency
management, threat assessment teams, all-hazards emergency management planning,
training, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, and the Clery Act. The
following chapter provides details on the methodology that was used for this research
study.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
Introduction
The purpose of this research study was to determine the relationship between
active faculty/staff participation in training exercises as part of implementation of an allhazards emergency management plan and the consistency and accuracy of response to
potential campus safety incidents in higher education. This study also examined the
relationship between implementation of an all-hazards emergency management plan and
knowledge of FERPA regulations when responding to potential campus safety incidents.
Participants
The participants in this research were selected from public two-year and four-year
colleges and universities in Missouri, which includes 21 public two-year institutions and
13 public four-year institutions. Of the 21 public two-year institutions located in the state,
17 institutions participated. One community college was used for the pilot study, and
three two-year institutions declined to participate. Of the 13 public four-year colleges and
universities located in Missouri, 12 institutions participated, and one four-year institution
declined to participate in the study.
Participants within the institutions were selected using purposive sampling and
stratified random sampling. According to Berg (2007), “When developing a purposive
sample, researchers use their special knowledge or expertise about some group to select
subjects who represent this population” (p. 44). The researcher selected participants who
should be directly involved and have knowledge of their institution‟s all-hazards
emergency management plan. Participants included the following from each college or
university, assuming the institution has the position: president, chief academic officer,
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dean of student services/student affairs, registrar, faculty members, public safety
director/chief of police, public safety officer, health/mental health professional, human
resource director, housing director, and emergency preparedness contact person. The
researcher reviewed each institution‟s web site to identify the names and e-mail addresses
of the selected positions. If the contact for the position could not be obtained from the
college‟s web site, the researcher communicated with the institution to determine the
appropriate contact person for the position.
Since faculty members represent the largest number of personnel employed at a
college or university, the researcher used stratified random sampling to select 20 full-time
faculty members to complete the survey at each college. Hinkle, et al. (2003) noted that
“When stratified random sampling is used, the researcher not only defines the strata but
also determines how many members of each stratum to include in the sample” (p. 145).
For this study, the researcher reviewed the various departments on each institution‟s web
site to ensure that representation from each was included. The number of full-time faculty
at two colleges was less than 20, and all of these individuals were invited to participate.
The goal of this research study was to obtain at least a 30% response rate from the
public two-year and four-year institutions. This goal was met with 29 institutions
participating, including 17 two-year and 12 four-year institutions, for an 85%
participation rate by institutions. A secondary goal was to obtain responses from at least
30% of each type of classification. Overall, 75% of the administrators, 27% of the
faculty, and 16% of the staff members who were invited to participate completed the
survey.
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This study was endorsed by the Higher Education Subcommittee of the Homeland
Security Advisory Council in Missouri and a request from the Commissioner of Higher
Education was included with the distribution of the survey and undoubtedly assisted with
response rates, particularly by administrators. The goal was to encourage a higher
response rate than might be expected without this endorsement and request.
Instrument
A web-based survey designed by the researcher was used in this study (see
Appendix A) and was administered using Flashlight, an online surveying tool. The survey
included two campus emergency scenarios, each followed by a series of statements
related to personal and institutional responsibility as they related to the crisis. After the
second scenario was presented, the survey included statements regarding federal
regulations, specifically related to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA). Participants were also asked to respond to general statements regarding
personal and institutional practices related to all-hazards emergency management
planning and training but were asked to respond to the survey without referencing their
institution‟s emergency management plan. The study utilized a five-point Likert scale,
with responses ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Demographic
information related to each participant was also collected. The survey took approximately
10 minutes for participants to complete.
The first scenario that was presented to participants involved a college student
who brought a weapon to campus. Participants were presented with the following
information: “Dave, a student, brings a gun to school and is seen with the weapon on
campus. As Brian, another student, is telling you that Dave has a gun, you hear what

42

sounds like shots fired in an adjoining hallway in your building.” A set of statements
concerning each participant‟s personal role/responsibility was presented. For example,
participants responded to each response listed in Table 1 using the five-point Likert scale
with Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Neutral (N), Disagree (D), and Strongly Disagree
(SD): “As soon as I hear shots fired, I would:”
Table 1
Personal Responsibility Statements to Which Participants Were Asked to Respond
Statement

Response

Leave my office/classroom to see what was happening

SA

A

N

D

SD

Lock my office/classroom door

SA

A

N

D

SD

Call the Director of Public Safety/Chief of Police

SA

A

N

D

SD

Call 911

SA

A

N

D

SD

Alert the campus community that there is an
armed person on campus

SA

A

N

D

SD

Do nothing

SA

A

N

D

SD

Participants were also asked to respond to statements concerning institutional
responsibility. For example, “When my institution is aware that there is a gunman on
campus, my institution is responsible for:”
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Table 2
Institutional Responsibility Statements to Which Participants Were Asked to Respond
Statement

Response

Notifying the campus community

SA A

N

D

SD

Calling 911

SA A

N

D

SD

Locking down the campus

SA A

N

D

SD

Maintaining regular communication with the campus
community

SA A

N

D

SD

After the first set of statements had been answered, participants were presented
with a second scenario in which the situation had intensified. Participants read the
following statements: “Situation escalates. Dave takes a classroom of students and their
instructor hostage.”
Participants were asked to respond to additional statements concerning personal
and institutional responsibility and to statements concerning federal regulations using the
five-point Likert scale. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) was the
focus of these statements, with a sample including the following: “FERPA allows me to
release information regarding Dave‟s behavior to his parents.”
Participants were also asked to respond to a series of general statements
concerning their institution‟s all-hazards emergency management plan and training
protocol using the five-point Likert scale. An example of these statements included “I
participate in training and/or drills related to campus violence (e.g., active shooter and/or
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hostage situation) at least annually as part of my institution‟s emergency management
plan.”
The survey also asked participants to respond to various demographic questions,
such as position, classification of position, status as emergency management coordinator
at his/her institution, employment at a two-year or four-year institution, name of
institution, number of years in current position, number of years in profession, highest
degree earned, gender, and age.
Reliability
Reliability is an essential component of any research study. As stated by Groves,
et al. (2004), “„Reliability‟ is a measure of variability of answers over repeated
conceptual trials. Reliability addresses the question of whether respondents are consistent
or stable in their answers” (p. 261). In order to ensure reliability of the survey designed
by the researcher, a field test was performed with various higher education personnel on
the researcher‟s campus following receipt of Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval
from the University of Missouri-St. Louis and from the researcher‟s own campus. Thirtyone individuals were invited to participate, and 17 responses were received, for a 55%
response rate. Twelve faculty, four staff, and one administrator participated in the pilot
study. Feedback was received about the time required to complete the survey.
Additionally, Cronbach‟s alpha was used to identify the internal consistency of the
survey instrument. When considering all of the personal responsibility and institutional
responsibility questions pertaining to both scenarios, Cronbach‟s alpha was .702. The
removal of two of the personal responsibility questions in the second scenario increased
the internal reliability of the survey to .765. For the questions related to FERPA,
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Cronbach‟s alpha was .828; therefore, no changes were made to this portion of the survey
instrument.
Validity
The validity of the researcher‟s web-based survey was also evaluated. According
to Groves, et al. (2004), validity is “the extent to which the survey measure accurately
reflects the intended construct” (p. 254). The researcher presented the survey to members
of the Higher Education Subcommittee of the Homeland Security Advisory Council in
Missouri to field test the survey for content validity. Members of this subcommittee
include professionals from higher education, law enforcement, homeland security, fire
safety, campus public safety, mental health, health and senior services, and law.
Additionally, students participate in this subcommittee. The individuals serving on this
subcommittee were well qualified to provide input on the survey questionnaire. The
researcher made minor adjustments to the survey instrument based on recommendations
from the Higher Education Subcommittee.
Review of Emergency Management Plans
One of the purposes of this research study was to determine the relationship
between implementation of an all-hazards emergency management plan that includes
faculty/staff participation in training exercises and the accuracy of response to potential
campus safety incidents in higher education, as called for by the plan. The researcher
reviewed each institution‟s web site to obtain the emergency management plan. If the
researcher could not locate an institution‟s plan on their web site, the institution was
contacted to request a copy of the campus violence section of their emergency
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management plan. The researcher was able to obtain emergency management plans for
27 of the 29 participating institutions.
During the course of this review, it became evident that a variety of emergency
management guidelines existed for both community colleges and four-year colleges and
universities, including full-scale plans, brochures, quick reference guides, flip charts, and
informational web pages. The documents ranged from one page to over 40 pages and
were referred to by various names, including emergency management plans, emergency
action plans, emergency operations plans, emergency response plans, emergency
response guides, campus emergency preparedness guides, emergency procedures, and
crisis management plans. For the purposes of this study, all documents will be referred to
as emergency management plans.
In order to ensure accuracy of response, each institution‟s emergency
management plan was reviewed to identify where the response to each survey question
may be found in the plan. The researcher discovered that answers to the personal
responsibility questions were mostly identified in the emergency management plans, but
many of the documents did not include information that would tell an employee how to
respond to the institutional responsibility questions. Therefore, the review focused
exclusively on accurate responses to 16 of the personal responsibility questions.
The researcher used a survey template and circled the correct response to each
personal responsibility question based on each institution‟s emergency management plan.
If the researcher located the answer to a specific question, the appropriate response of
strongly agree/agree or strongly disagree/disagree was selected for the question, based on
the information in the plan. If the researcher could not find the answer to the question in
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the emergency management plan, neutral was selected. The researcher then used
intercoder reliability to confirm consistency in coding by asking another employee in
higher education (a recent Ph.D. graduate) to review 50% of the plans and perform the
same analysis. Different variations of emergency management documents were reviewed
by the coder. After the coder reviewed the first two plans, she contacted the researcher to
obtain clarification. Once the coder had reviewed the plans, they were returned to the
researcher to compare responses. Then the researcher and the coder met to review any
inconsistencies. There were only two questions in the active shooter scenario on which
the researcher and coder had responded differently on some plans. These questions were
“Call the Director of Public Safety/Chief of Police” and “Assist the injured person.” After
discussing the reasoning for each of our selections, the researcher and the coder reached
consensus on the appropriate response to the questions. The researcher also reviewed the
other plans to ensure accuracy in response for these questions. Once the survey was
conducted, the researcher compared the responses of each participant for the personal
responsibility questions against the responses found in his/her institution‟s emergency
management plan to determine how accurately each participant‟s responses matched the
institution‟s plan.
Procedure
The researcher obtained approval from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at
the University of Missouri-St. Louis (UMSL), then contacted each public higher
education institution in Missouri to determine how to obtain IRB approval at those
institutions. Of the 33 public institutions that were targeted for this research study, seven
required the researcher to go through their campus‟ IRB application process. Seventeen
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institutions permitted the researcher to provide a copy of UMSL‟s IRB approval as
satisfying their requirements. One institution requested the IRB application submitted to
UMSL. Two institutions engaged in dialogue with the researcher about her study but did
not require any additional documentation. Additionally, six institutions advised that no
permission was required to administer a survey of this variety on their campus. Seventeen
institutions requested to see a copy of the researcher‟s survey, 10 institutions requested a
dissertation abstract, four institutions requested a copy of the e-mail that would be sent to
individuals asking them to participate in the research study, and two institutions
requested a copy of the administrators, faculty, and staff at their institutions who would
be asked to participate in this research study.
During the process of obtaining permission to conduct research at each institution,
it was discovered that one institution preferred to initially contact the administrators,
faculty, and staff prior to the researcher sending the survey, while other institutions
volunteered to e-mail individuals and encourage participation. The researcher was more
successful in obtaining responses from the institutions at which administrators, faculty,
and staff were encouraged to participate.
A major goal was to ensure that participants understood the importance of this
research study. The researcher consulted with Missouri‟s Commissioner of Higher
Education and the Higher Education Subcommittee of the Homeland Security Advisory
Council on this project, and the Commissioner agreed to write a letter of support for this
study on behalf of the Higher Education Subcommittee (see Appendix B). This letter was
provided as a link in the e-mail that was sent to each administrator, faculty, or staff
member asking for his/her participation in this research study. Additionally, the president
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of the researcher‟s institution sent an e-mail to his colleagues asking for their institution‟s
support and participation in this research study.
As noted above, each college or university‟s web site was reviewed to identify the
e-mail address of each individual to be surveyed, with 20 full-time faculty members
randomly selected by the researcher from each institution‟s web site. For the two
institutions that employed less than 20 full-time faculty, all full-time faculty employed at
these two institutions were included. If the researcher was unable to locate the desired
position on an institution‟s web site or was uncertain as to who served in this capacity,
the researcher contacted the institution to obtain this information.
While the researcher knew the identity of each participant, the participants
remained anonymous throughout the research study. The researcher made contact with
the participants at each institution through their college e-mail addresses, but e-mail
addresses were not visible when e-mails were sent to participants to ensure
confidentiality. E-mails requesting participation were sent to all participants at the same
institution at the same time. In the initial e-mail contact (see Appendix C), the researcher
explained the purpose and value of the study, included a link to the letter of support from
the Commissioner of Higher Education, ensured that confidentiality would be
maintained, explained the informed consent process, and requested participation. The
researcher also provided a link to the web-based survey. The first phase of data collection
yielded 125 responses, or 50%, of the survey responses.
After a 10-day time period, another e-mail was sent to participants who had not
yet completed the web-based survey. The subject line indicated “Reminder: Campus
Safety Survey.” Another link to the web-based survey was included in the e-mail
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message. The researcher received an additional 97 responses, or 37%, during this time
period. After another 10-day time period, a final reminder e-mail with the subject line
“Final Reminder: Campus Safety Survey” went to all participants who had not yet
completed the web-based survey. This e-mail also included the link to the web-based
survey. The final reminder resulted in another 29 responses, or 11%, of the total received.
Design
A quantitative research design was employed in this research study. The
dependent variables included the responses to each of the personal responsibility,
institutional responsibility, and FERPA questions. These responses assisted in identifying
the consistency of response to potential campus safety incidents, accuracy of response to
potential campus safety incidents, and knowledge level of FERPA regulations. The
independent variables included responses to the emergency management planning and
training questions as well as various demographic factors, including position,
classification of position, status as emergency management coordinator at his/her
institution, employment at a two-year or four-year institution, name of institution, number
of years in current position, number of years in profession, highest degree earned, gender,
and age.
Data collected through the researcher‟s web-based survey were analyzed using the
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). The General Linear Model (GLM) –
multivariate analysis with multiple criterion variables was used to analyze data. The
GLM is “A general statistical model describing the linear relationship between one or
more dependent variables and one or more independent variables” (Bryman and Cramer,
2011, p. 354). Multivariate analysis is “The analysis of the relationship(s) between more

51

than two variables” (Bryman and Cramer, 2011, p. 357). Multiple criterion variables in
this case included the different dependent variables used in this study, including the
responses to each of the personal responsibility, institutional responsibility, and FERPA
questions. Multivariate analysis was used to identify what independent variables were
significant in the presence of all dependent variables. Additionally, this statistical tool
allowed the researcher to use between-subjects effects to determine if a relationship
existed between the dependent variables and each of the significant independent
variables.
Data was also analyzed using crosstabulations and case summaries. A
crosstabulation, also referred to as a contingency table, is “A table comprising rows and
columns that includes at least two variables and that expresses the association between
variables. Contingency tables include frequencies, i.e. the number of cases for each
intersection in the table” (Bryman and Cramer, 2011, p. 351). Crosstabulations were used
to identify relationships between dependent variables and/or independent variables. For
example, crosstabulations were used to determine consistency in response for all personal
responsibility, institutional responsibility, and FERPA questions by institution and by
classification. Crosstabulations also served to identify how institutions responded to
various demographic and emergency management independent variables.
Case summaries, or a report that identifies responses to each dependent variable
by specific independent variables, were also used to analyze data. For example, case
summaries were used to identify the accuracy of response for all personal responsibility
and FERPA questions by institution and by classification within institution.
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Limitations
This study was limited by several factors that are indicative of characteristics of
both the nature of the study and the institutions involved. There were some institutions,
such as community colleges, that did not have all participant positions. For example, 12
of the community colleges did not have housing, four of the community colleges did not
have health/mental health professionals, and two did not have public safety departments
on campus. Additionally, two of the two-year institutions are part of community college
districts and have district coordinators for the Human Resources and Registrar
departments. Two institutions also did not specifically identify an emergency
preparedness contact person and utilized a group of individuals to serve in this capacity.
In these cases, there were not comparable responses from each institution.
The researcher also received low response rates from one of the employee groups.
Despite three e-mail requests for participation, only 16% of staff members who received
the survey chose to participate. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the low response rate
from staff members limited the ability of the researcher to draw firm conclusions from
the data, especially related to training.
The study was further limited by the fact that some institutions did not provide
emergency management plans, and by the vast differences among plans in terms of
completeness. This finding is important to the study because in some cases, it did limit
the ability of the model to compare responses by participants to statements in their
institutional plans.
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Summary
This chapter provided comprehensive information on the methodology that was
used to collect and analyze data for this research study. A web-based survey designed by
the researcher was administered using an online survey tool, and the reliability and
validity of the survey were reviewed. Administrators, faculty, and staff at 29 public
higher education institutions in Missouri were surveyed to identify their consistency and
accuracy of response to potential campus safety incidents and their knowledge of FERPA
regulations when responding to these incidents. Participants also responded to various
demographic and emergency management planning and training questions to assist with
identifying their level of emergency preparedness. Emergency management plans were
also reviewed for 27 institutions to assist in determining accuracy of response to the
survey questions. Multivariate analysis with multiple criterion variables, crosstabulations,
and case summaries were used to analyze the data in SPSS. Chapter 4 includes the
findings from this research.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS
Introduction
Chapter 4 focuses on describing the participants in this research study, reviews
the survey instrument and the results obtained, and reports how the researcher dealt with
missing data. The statistical tools that were used to analyze data are presented. The
chapter also includes a discussion of emergency management planning and training at the
participating institutions. Each of the six hypotheses is examined with a report on the
findings of this research. Additionally, comments are shared that the researcher received
from both participants and non-participants regarding her study.
Participants
A total of 802 administrators, faculty, and staff from 29 public higher education
institutions in Missouri were invited to participate in this research study. A total of 251,
or 31%, completed the survey. Responses were received from 159 participants at
community colleges and 92 individuals at four-year colleges and universities. Overall
response rates from each institution ranged from a minimum of 14% to a maximum of
75% of those invited to participate. Six participant response sets were eliminated due to
insufficient data, which was defined as responses missing more than 25% of the
requested information. Therefore, the survey results are based on responses from 245
administrators, faculty, and staff.
Figure 3 identifies the number of administrators, faculty, and staff who
participated in this research study by type of institution. Overall, 65 administrators, 155
faculty, and 24 staff responded (one individual did not report his/her classification). Of
the 65 administrators, 31 represented community colleges and 34 were from four-year
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colleges and universities. Of the 155 faculty, 104 represented community colleges and 51
were from four-year colleges and universities. Finally, of the 24 staff members who
participated, 17 represented community colleges, while seven represented four-year
colleges and universities.
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Figure 3. Number of Participants by Classification and Type of Institution.

One hundred fourteen of the 245 participants were male, while 126 were female.
Five participants did not identify their gender. The age of participants ranged from 26 to
77 with a mean age of 50. The number of years in the respondent‟s current position
ranged from 0 to 52 with a mean of 10 years, while the number of years in the profession
ranged from 0 to 52 with a mean of 21 years.
Eighteen respondents reported that they are the emergency management
coordinators at their institutions, including 10 administrators, one faculty member, and
seven staff members. Of these 18 emergency management coordinators, four did not
provide their positions and the remaining 14 identified their positions as follows: Chief of
Police (3 respondents), Dean of Student Affairs, Director, Director of Facilities, Director
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of Health and Wellness Services, Director of Institutional Safety, Director of Safety,
Director of Security, Director of Student Life and Development, Faculty (Environmental
Health and Safety), Interim Provost, and Risk Manager. Respondents at two institutions
reported more than one emergency management coordinator. Therefore, there were 14
cases in which a college or university did not have a response from a person identifying
him or herself as the emergency management coordinator.
The response rate to the survey for administrators was better than expected, and
the rate for faculty approached the desired 30% considered acceptable for statistical
analysis. The percentage received from staff was disappointing, but with the declining
response rate with each reminder to potential participants, it was determined that attempts
to solicit further surveys would be fruitless. This disparity in response rates complicates
some of the analysis as will be discussed later. A more significant issue, however, is that
rates for groups varied by institution, making it impossible to determine if training
occurred evenly among employee groups, and therefore if training percentages
represented the institution as a whole. For this reason, some of the findings must be
viewed as inferences that suggest issues demanding further investigation, rather than as
accurate representations of the institutions as a whole.
Instrument
The researcher designed a web-based survey that served as the primary data
collection instrument for this study. The survey included an active shooter scenario and a
hostage scenario for which participants were asked to respond to a series of personal
responsibility, institutional responsibility, and FERPA questions. The survey also
included questions related to emergency management planning and training at each
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institution. A five-point Likert scale, with responses ranging from strongly agree to
strongly disagree, was used for this survey. Additionally, demographic information was
collected from each participant.
The researcher used Cronbach‟s alpha to identify the internal consistency of the
survey instrument. When considering all of the personal responsibility, institutional
responsibility, and FERPA questions pertaining to both scenarios, Cronbach‟s alpha was
.765. The researcher also reviewed the internal consistency for the categories of
dependent variables. For the personal responsibility questions, Cronbach‟s alpha was
.668; for the institutional responsibility questions, Cronbach‟s alpha was .877; and for the
FERPA questions, Cronbach‟s alpha was .777. The standard for an acceptable
Cronbach‟s alpha result is .70 or above (Nunnally, 1978, as cited in Bryman and Cramer,
2011). Therefore, when considering all variables together, the internal consistency of the
survey instrument was acceptable.
Adjusting For Missing Data
Responses from six participants were not used in data analysis because they were
missing significant data, which was defined as not responding to 25% or more of the
survey questions. For the other respondents who did not answer one or more questions in
the personal responsibility, institutional responsibility, or FERPA categories, the
following procedure was used to complete missing data. The researcher identified what
she believed to be three of the most important demographic variables in the study,
including classification (administrator, faculty, or staff), employment at a two-year or
four-year institution, and gender. The researcher then reviewed the mean response to each
question using the three demographic variables identified above. Any missing personal
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responsibility, institutional responsibility, or FERPA responses were assigned the
appropriate mean response based on the three demographic variables that matched the
respondent. This served to keep the answers of these individuals with missing data
“statistically neutral” for questions where no answer was provided.
Descriptive Statistics
The means, standard deviations, and variances for the dependent variables in this
research study vary considerably. When considering only the personal responsibility
questions, the mean values ranged from 1.0795 (S1PR7) to 4.7914 (S2PR5), and standard
deviations were as small as .29682 (S1PR7) to as large as 1.37176 (S1PR12). The
variances ranged from .088 (S1PR7) to 1.882 (S1PR12). There was much consensus
about the statement pertaining to the active shooter scenario that indicated “Do nothing”
(S1PR7). Ninety-three percent of participants responded that they strongly disagreed with
this statement. There was agreement about “Be observant of my surroundings” (S2PR5)
for the hostage scenario. Eighty-two percent of respondents indicated that they strongly
agreed that this was important. However, there was not consensus about whether to
“Alert the campus community that someone has been injured” (S1PR12). While 58%
strongly agreed or agreed, 24% of participants strongly disagreed or disagreed,
accounting for the larger standard deviation and variance in response.
For the institutional responsibility questions, the mean values ranged from 4.5598
(S1IR3) to 4.8490 (S2IR2), and standard deviations ranged from .45001 (S2IR2) to
.80412 (S1IR3). The variances ranged from .203 (S1IR5 and S2IR2) to .647 (S1IR3).
There was greater agreement on the institutional responsibility questions than the
personal responsibility questions. For example, 88% of respondents strongly agreed that
the institution should “Call 911” (S2IR2) when a hostage situation occurs. The standard
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deviation and variance for this dependent variable were small. While 71% of participants
strongly agreed that their institution is responsible for “Locking down the campus”
(SIIR3) during an active shooter situation, the standard deviation and variance were
somewhat larger as some individuals did not agree with this statement.
The mean values ranged from 2.2366 (F3) to 3.4653 (F2) when reviewing the
three questions related to FERPA. The standard deviations were large but very close and
ranged from 1.40105 (F2) to 1.51861 (F1), while the variances were large and ranged
from 1.963 (F2) to 2.306 (F1). These results indicate that there was not consensus on the
correct response to the FERPA questions. Participants responded at both ends of the
spectrum for these questions.
General Linear Model – Multivariate Analysis
The General Linear Model (GLM) using multivariate analysis with multiple
criterion variables was one of the statistical tools used to analyze the research data. The
dependent variables are comprised of the questions from the active shooter and hostage
scenarios, including the 18 questions concerning personal responsibility, the 12 questions
regarding institutional responsibility, and the three FERPA questions.
The independent variables are comprised of various demographic data as well as
data related to emergency management planning and training at each institution. The
demographic variables included the following:









Position
Classification
Emergency management coordinator
Employment at a two-year or four-year institution
Employment at which institution
Number of years in current position
Number of years in profession
Highest degree earned
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Gender
Age

The emergency management variables included the following:













Implementation of emergency management plan at the respondent‟s
institution
Reading of institution‟s emergency management plan
Plan addresses active shooter situation
Plan addresses hostage situation
Involvement in the development of the institution‟s emergency
management plan
Participation in training and/or drills related to campus violence at least
annually
Mandatory participation in training and/or drills for administrators
Mandatory participation in training and/or drills for full-time faculty
Mandatory participation in training and/or drills for part-time faculty
Mandatory participation in training and/or drills for full-time staff
Mandatory participation in training and/or drills for part-time staff
Mandatory participation in training and/or drills for student workers

One of the advantages of using multivariate analysis with multiple criterion
variables was that the probability of making a Type I error was reduced. Additionally,
analyzing all of the dependent variables together provided a more “sensitive measure of
the effects of the independent variables” (Bryman and Cramer, 2011, p. 263).
The multivariate analysis performed on the 33 dependent variables together found
that only three independent variables were significant at the .05 level. These three are
analyzed in detail in Table 3. Two of these are demographic variables, position as
emergency management coordinator and number of years in profession. Serving as the
emergency management coordinator at his/her institution was significant at .008. The
second demographic variable, number of years in profession, was significant at .002. The
third significant independent variable is an emergency management variable,
participation in training and/or drills is mandatory for student workers, and was
significant at .035.
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Table 3
Multivariate Tests
Effect
D3 – Emergency

Value

F

Hypothesis df

Error df

Sig.

a

33.000

132.000

.008

a

33.000

132.000

.008

a

33.000

132.000

.008

a

33.000

132.000

.008

a

33.000

132.000

.002

a

33.000

132.000

.002

a

33.000

132.000

.002

a

33.000

132.000

.002

a

33.000

132.000

.035

a

33.000

132.000

.035

a

33.000

132.000

.035

a

33.000

132.000

.035

Pillai's Trace

.315

1.843 *

Wilks' Lambda

.685

1.843 *

Hotelling's Trace

.461

1.843 *

Roy's Largest Root

.461

1.843 *

Pillai's Trace

.341

2.072 *

Wilks' Lambda

.659

2.072 *

Hotelling's Trace

.518

2.072 *

Roy's Largest Root

.518

2.072 *

Pillai's Trace

.285

1.591 *

Wilks' Lambda

.715

1.591 *

Hotelling's Trace

.398

1.591 *

Roy's Largest Root

.398

1.591 *

management
coordinator

D7 – # of years in
profession

E12 – Participation
in training and/or
drills is mandatory
for student workers

Note. a = exact statistic
*p < .05
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When looking at the between-subject effects for the three significant independent
variables, many relationships were identified. Table 4 identifies the 10 dependent
variables that were significant with emergency management coordinator, the four
dependent variables that were significant with the number of years in profession, and the
five dependent variables that were significant with mandatory participation in training for
student workers. One of the dependent variables, the FERPA question related to releasing
information about Dave‟s behavior to students, was significant with all three independent
variables. The other two FERPA questions about releasing information to Dave‟s parents
and to colleagues were significant with emergency management coordinator and number
of years in profession.
The personal responsibility question for the active shooter scenario, “Leave my
office/classroom to see what was happening” and the personal responsibility question for
the hostage scenario, “I feel well prepared” were significant with two of the independent
variables, emergency management coordinator and mandatory participation in training
for student workers. The personal responsibility question for the active shooter scenario,
“Confront the gunman” was also significant with two of the independent variables,
emergency management coordinator and number of years in profession.
Table 4
Test of Between-Subjects Effects: Three Independent Variables
Source

Dependent Variable

Type III Sum

Df

Mean

of Squares
D3 – Emergency

S1PR2 – Leave my

management

office/classroom to see

coordinator

what was happening

12.508

F

Sig.

Square

1

12.508

9.852*

.002
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Source

Dependent Variable

Type III Sum

Df

Mean

of Squares
D3 – Emergency

S1PR9 – Confront the

management

gunman

F

Sig.

Square

15.154

1

15.154

23.187*

.000

2.078

1

2.078

4.591*

.034

2.682

1

2.682

3.946*

.049

16.440

1

16.440

17.701*

.000

5.860

1

5.860

5.578*

.019

2.052

1

2.052

4.006*

.047

9.432

1

9.432

4.687*

.032

coordinator
S1IR8 – Maintaining
regular communication
with the campus
community

S2PR1 – I feel well
prepared

S2PR2 – Confront Dave
physically

S2PR3 – Confront Dave
verbally

S2IR4 – Maintaining
regular communication
with the campus
community

F1 – Release
information to Dave’s
parents
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Source

Dependent Variable

Type III Sum

Df

Mean

of Squares
D3 – Emergency

F2 – Release

management

information to my

coordinator

colleagues

F3 – Release

F

Sig.

Square

7.679

1

7.679

4.289*

.040

31.912

1

31.912

18.003*

.000

3.105

1

3.105

4.751*

.031

11.152

1

11.152

5.542*

.020

16.422

1

16.422

9.172*

.003

17.535

1

17.535

9.893*

.002

6.719

1

6.719

5.292*

.023

information to students

D7 – Number of

S1PR9 – Confront the

years in profession

gunman

F1 – Release
information to Dave’s
parents

F2 – Release
information to my
colleagues

F3 – Release
information to students

E12 –

S1PR2 – Leave my

Participation

office/classroom to see

in training

what was happening

and/or drills is
mandatory
for student
workers
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Source

Dependent Variable

Type III Sum

Df

Mean

of Squares
E12 –

F

Sig.

Square

S1PR5 – Call 911

2.005

1

2.005

3.910*

.050

S1IR3 – Locking down

3.169

1

3.169

5.750*

.018

3.924

1

3.924

5.773*

.017

8.184

1

8.184

4.617*

.033

Participation
in training
and/or drills is
mandatory
for student
workers

the campus

S2PR1 – I feel well
prepared

F3 – Release
information to students

Note. S1 = Scenario 1; S2 = Scenario 2; PR = personal responsibility questions; IR = institutional
responsibility questions; F = FERPA questions.
*p = < .05

Emergency Management Coordinator
When looking more closely at the relationship between the independent variable,
emergency management coordinator, and all of the dependent variables, the researcher
discovered that additional dependent variables were significant when multivariate
analysis was performed using only this independent variable. Some dependent variables

66

were also no longer significant. This occurred because the number of independent
variables being analyzed decreased to only one as opposed to all independent variables.
Table 5 presents the dependent variables that were significant in the presence of
only the emergency management coordinator independent variable. Bold indicates a new
significant dependent variable, black indicates a dependent variable that was previously
identified as significant, and italics indicate a dependent variable that was no longer
significant. All of the new significant variables were personal responsibility questions
related to the active shooter and hostage scenarios. The variables that were no longer
significant were institutional responsibility questions related to the active shooter and
hostage scenarios.
Table 5
Test of Between-Subjects Effects: Emergency Management Coordinator
Source

Dependent Variable

Type III Sum

Df

of Squares
D3 –

S1PR1 – I feel well prepared

Mean

F

Sig.

Square

19.380

1

19.380

17.101*

.000

20.060

1

20.060

15.431*

.000

9.649

1

9.649

6.146*

.014

Emergency
management
coordinator
S1PR2 – Leave my
office/classroom to see what was
happening

S1PR6 – Alert the campus
community that there is an
armed person on campus
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Source

Dependent Variable

Type III Sum

Df

of Squares
D3 –

Mean

F

Sig.

Square

S1PR9 – Confront the gunman

40.316

1

40.316

49.963*

.000

S1PR12 – Alert the campus

10.151

1

10.151

5.455*

.020

S2PR1 – I feel well prepared

29.962

1

29.962

22.356*

.000

S2PR2 – Confront Dave

48.795

1

48.795

40.899*

.000

S2PR3 – Confront Dave verbally

5.449

1

5.449

4.669*

.032

S2PR4 – Try to establish a

4.828

1

4.828

4.183*

.042

39.797

1

39.797

18.559*

.000

21.017

1

21.017

11.092*

.001

47.542

1

47.542

26.325*

.000

Emergency
management
coordinator

community that someone has
been injured

physically

rapport with Dave

F1 – Release information to
Dave’s parents

F2 – Release information to my
colleagues

F3 – Release information to
students
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Source

Dependent Variable

Type III Sum

Df

of Squares
D3 –

S1IR8 – Maintain regular

Emergency

communication with the campus

management

community

Mean

F

Sig.

Square

.067

1

.067

.158

.691

.131

1

.131

.256

.614

coordinator
S2IR4 – Maintain regular
communication with the campus
community

Note. S1 = Scenario 1; S2 = Scenario 2; PR = personal responsibility questions; IR = institutional
responsibility questions; F = FERPA questions.
*p = < .05

This analysis identifies an important relationship between an individual who is the
emergency management coordinator and the knowledge that he/she possesses when
personally responding to campus safety incidents, including the active shooter and
hostage scenarios. As one would hope, emergency management coordinators are well
informed on how to respond to incidents of campus violence.
Number of Years in Profession
When performing multivariate analysis on the number of years in profession as
the only independent variable, the four dependent variables that were previously
significant were no longer significant. However, four additional dependent variables were
significant as Table 6 demonstrates. Significant variables are identified in bold, while
italics indicate variables that were no longer significant. The new significant variables
consist of four personal responsibility questions for both scenarios. The variables that
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were no longer significant included one personal responsibility question for the active
shooter scenario and all of the FERPA questions.
The number of years in the higher education profession was also a good indicator
of how well prepared an administrator, faculty, or staff member is to respond to campus
safety incidents. Three of the significant dependent variables related to contacting the
appropriate authorities when an incident of campus violence occurs. Therefore, an
employee who has more experience is more likely to be prepared to respond
appropriately to campus safety incidents.
Table 6
Test of Between-Subjects Effects: Number of Years in Profession
Source

Dependent Variable

Type III Sum

Df

of Squares
D7 – Number

S1PR4 – Call the Director of

of years in

Public Safety/Chief of Police

Mean

F

Sig.

Square

58.919

45

1.309

1.456*

.045

S1PR5 – Call 911

33.507

45

.745

1.764*

.005

S1PR11 – Call 911

29.108

45

.647

1.743*

.006

S2PR1 – I feel well prepared

92.226

45

2.049

1.519*

.029

S1PR9 – Confront the gunman

46.540

45

1.034

1.122

.295

102.883

45

2.286

.965

.541

profession

F1 – Release information to
Dave’s parents
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Source

Dependent Variable

Type III Sum

Df

of Squares
D7 – Number

F2 – Release information to my

of years in

colleagues

Mean

F

Sig.

Square

92.492

45

2.055

1.072

.365

83.072

45

1.846

.873

.698

profession
F3 – Release information to
students

Note. S1 = Scenario 1; S2 = Scenario 2; PR = personal responsibility questions; IR = institutional
responsibility questions; F = FERPA questions.
*p = < .05

Participation in Training and/or Drills is Mandatory for Student Workers
The test of between-subjects effects for the independent variable, participation in
training and/or drills is mandatory for student workers, identified four additional
dependent variables that were significant. There were three dependent variables that were
no longer significant as Table 7 shows. Bold indicates new dependent variables that were
significant, black identifies dependent variables that were previously identified as
significant, and italics indicate dependent variables that were no longer significant. Three
of the new significant variables were personal responsibility questions for both scenarios,
and one variable was an institutional responsibility question for the hostage scenario. The
variables that were no longer significant were a combination of personal responsibility,
institutional responsibility, and FERPA questions.
Although students were not included in this research, it is interesting that student
worker participation in training was significantly related to some of the dependent
variables for both the active shooter and hostage scenarios. One might conclude that

71

some of the respondents were involved in training student workers and therefore became
more knowledgeable about their personal and institutional responsibilities when
responding to incidents of campus violence.
Table 7
Test of Between-Subjects Effects: Participation in Training and/or Drills is Mandatory
for Student Workers
Source

Dependent Variable

Type III Sum

Df

Mean

of Squares
E12 – Participation

F

Sig.

Square

S1PR1 – I feel well prepared

16.328

4

4.082

3.491*

.009

S1PR2 – Leave my

20.729

4

5.182

4.028*

.004

13.733

4

3.433

4.319*

.002

S2PR1 – I feel well prepared

21.995

4

5.499

3.956*

.004

S2PR2 – Confront Dave

13.238

4

3.310

2.490*

.044

6.265

4

1.566

3.077*

.017

in training and/or
drills is mandatory
for student workers

office/classroom to see what
was happening

S1PR8 – Assist the injured
person

physically

S2IR4 – Maintain regular
communication with the
campus community
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Source

Dependent Variable

Type III Sum

Df

Mean

of Squares
E12 – Participation

F

Sig.

Square

S1PR5 – Call 911

4.525

4

1.131

2.252

.064

S1IR3 – Locking down the

2.847

4

.712

1.085

.365

13.262

4

3.315

1.670

.158

in training and/or
drills is mandatory
for student workers

campus

F3 – Release information to
students

Note. S1 = Scenario 1; S2 = Scenario 2; PR = personal responsibility questions; IR = institutional
responsibility questions; F = FERPA questions.
*p = < .05

Emergency Management Planning and Training
The premise of this study was that personnel at institutions that have emergency
management plans that include training will respond more consistently and accurately to
potential campus safety incidents as well as have more knowledge of FERPA regulations
when responding to these incidents. Many questions in this research focused on each
institution‟s emergency management plan and active participation in training exercises.
Following are the results that relate to emergency management planning and training.
Emergency Management Plans
Of the 245 participants in this research study, 82% strongly agreed or agreed that
their institution had implemented an emergency management plan. However, only 62%
of administrators, faculty, and staff strongly agreed or agreed that they have read their
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institution‟s emergency management plan. Administrators were most likely to read their
institution‟s plan (85% strongly agreed or agreed), staff members were second (67%
strongly agreed or agreed), while faculty were least likely to have read their college‟s
plan (52% strongly agreed or agreed). Additionally, only 21% of participants strongly
agreed or agreed that they were involved in the development of their institution‟s
emergency management plan. Administrators were most likely to be involved in the
development of their institution‟s plan with 52% indicating that they strongly agreed or
agreed, followed by staff at 46%, and faculty at 5%.
In terms of content included in emergency management plans, 65% of participants
indicated that they strongly agreed or agreed that their institution‟s plan addressed an
active shooter situation, while only 49% strongly agreed or agreed that their plan
discussed a hostage situation. Of the 27 emergency management plans reviewed, 24
(89%) addressed an active shooter situation, while only 15 (56%) included information
on how to respond to a hostage situation.
When reviewing accuracy of response for what was included in each institution‟s
emergency management plan, Figure 4 shows that participants indicated they were not
very knowledgeable about what is included in their plans. While three institutions
indicated 100% accuracy regarding whether an active shooter situation was included in
their institution‟s emergency management plan, two institutions responded with 0%
accuracy. Overall, 13 institutions (48%) were at least 75% accurate and 19 institutions
(70%) were at least 50% accurate regarding the inclusion of an active shooter situation in
their institution‟s emergency management plan. However, at three institutions,
respondents were extremely unknowledgeable regarding the inclusion of an active
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shooter scenario in their plans. At these institutions, 64%, 67%, and 80% of respondents,
respectively, reported that their plan included this scenario when in actuality, it did not.
Accuracy regarding a hostage situation being included in plans was even lower.
Only one institution responded with 100% accuracy, while four institutions responded
with 0% accuracy. Three of the 27 institutions (11%) were at least 75% accurate and 10
institutions (37%) were at least 50% accurate regarding the inclusion of a hostage
situation in their institution‟s plan. A more significant number of respondents indicated
that their plans included a hostage situation when it did not. Respondents from eight
institutions reported percentages ranging from 43% to 70% of agreement that their plan
included response to this crisis when it did not. Since 38% of respondents indicated that
they had not read their institution‟s emergency management plan, it was not surprising
that awareness of what information is actually included in these plans was relatively low.
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Figure 4. Percentage Who Responded Accurately Regarding What is Included in Their
Institution‟s Emergency Management Plan.

It must be acknowledged at this point that in addition to uneven response rates by
employee type, response rates also varied by institution. The researcher hoped to receive
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at least five responses from each college but received four responses from two
institutions and two responses from two of the 29 colleges. These four colleges were
among the smallest in the state to participate, but these low rates contributed to the
challenges of drawing firm conclusions from the data.
Training
Only 35% of participants strongly agreed or agreed that they participate at least
annually in training and/or drills related to campus violence incidents (e.g., active shooter
and/or hostage situation). Training most frequently occurred with administrators (58%
strongly agreed or agreed), followed by staff (50% strongly agreed or agreed), and then
faculty (23% strongly agreed or agreed).
When asking about mandatory training and/or drills related to campus violence
for employees, respondents indicated that full-time employees were more likely to
receive training. Thirty-seven percent responded that they strongly agreed or agreed that
administrators participate in training, followed by 27% for full-time staff, 26% for fulltime faculty, 17% for part-time staff, 15% for part-time faculty, and 14% for student
workers.
The hypotheses in this research study were framed according to institutions that
have emergency management plans that include training and those that do not include
training. According to the participants, responses ranged from 0% to 100% by institution
that they strongly agreed or agreed that they participate in training and/or drills related to
campus violence at least annually. Figure 5 reports that only respondents from one
institution all agreed that they participate in training at least annually, while respondents
from five institutions unanimously agreed that they do not participate in training at least
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annually. Only eight institutions had consensus from at least 50% of their respondents
that they participate in training exercises on an annual basis. It must again be noted that
the number of respondents varied considerably from one institution to another. These
percentages must be viewed as indications of training activity rather than as statistical
evidence.
A limited number of respondents indicated that they participate in training and/or
drills related to campus violence at least annually. Since the highest percentage of
respondents was administrators, one might conclude that the training percentage may be
higher because administrators are most likely to participate in training.
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77

Null Hypotheses
The following null hypotheses were used to guide this research study. Each
hypothesis is examined in terms of the data collected, and a determination is made to
reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis.
Ho1: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency
management plan that includes training will not respond more consistently to
potential campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions
with an all-hazards emergency management plan that does not include training.
Ho2: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency
management plan that includes training will not respond more accurately to
potential campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions
with an all-hazards emergency management plan that does not include training.
Ho3: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency
management plan that includes training will not have more knowledge of FERPA
regulations when responding to potential campus safety incidents than personnel
at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency management plan
that does not include training.
Ho4: There will not be more consistency in response to potential campus safety
incidents by personnel in similar positions at various higher education institutions
when the institutions have all-hazards emergency management plans that include
training than institutions that have all-hazards emergency management plans that
do not include training.
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Ho5: There will not be more knowledge of FERPA regulations when responding
to potential campus safety incidents by personnel in similar positions at various
higher education institutions when the institutions have all-hazards emergency
management plans that include training than institutions that have all-hazards
emergency management plans that do not include training.
Ho6: Personnel in administrative positions at higher education institutions will not
respond more accurately to potential campus safety incidents than personnel in
non-administrative positions.
When reviewing consistency of response for the personal responsibility,
institutional responsibility, and FERPA questions for the active shooter and hostage
scenarios, the researcher looked for the frequency with which respondents answered the
same within an institution. For accuracy of response, the correct answers to the personal
responsibility questions for each institution were identified by reviewing each
institution‟s emergency management plan. Based on this criterion, each individual‟s
responses were manually compared with the correct response for his/her institution.
Null Hypothesis #1
Ho1: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency
management plan that includes training will not respond more consistently to potential
campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions with an allhazards emergency management plan that does not include training.
This hypothesis first is reviewed in terms of consistency of response to the
personal responsibility questions, and then the institutional responsibility questions for
the active shooter scenario, by institution and by participation in training. The analysis is
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then repeated for the hostage scenario in the same sequence. Both scenarios are then
reviewed together for overall consistency for each set of questions.
When reviewing the mean consistency in response to all of the personal
responsibility questions for the active shooter scenario in Figure 6, 19 of the 29
institutions reported at least an 80% mean consistency rate, while 27 of the 29 institutions
indicated at least a 75% mean consistency rate. All institutions responded consistently to
at least 71% of the personal responsibility questions for the active shooter scenario.
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Figure 6. Mean Percentage of Consistency for the Personal Responsibility Questions for
the Active Shooter Scenario and Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in Training
at Least Annually by Institution.

When comparing the mean consistency in response for the personal responsibility
questions to participation in training, the data showed that the level of training provided
did not indicate that personnel will respond more consistently. Figure 6 indicates that the
mean percentage of consistency in response for the personal responsibility questions for
the active shooter scenario was higher for 28 of the 29 institutions than for the percentage
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who indicated that they participate in training at least annually. While some institutions
with high consistency rates indicated that they participate in more training, other
institutions participating in little or no training still had high consistency rates. For
example, Institution #12 had a mean consistency rate of 91% and a training participation
rate of 100%. However, Institution #4 had a mean consistency rate of 90% and no
participation in training.
Figure 7 indicates that eight of the 29 institutions reported 100% mean
consistency when responding to the institutional responsibility questions for the active
shooter scenario. Twenty-six of the 29 institutions responded the same for at least 90% of
the questions. All institutions responded consistently to at least 82% of the institutional
responsibility questions.
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Figure 7. Mean Percentage of Consistency for the Institutional Responsibility Questions
for the Active Shooter Scenario and Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in
Training at Least Annually by Institution.
When comparing the mean consistency in response for the institutional
responsibility questions to participation in training, data indicated that the level of
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training provided did not show that personnel will respond more consistently. The mean
percentage of consistency in response for the institutional responsibility questions for the
active shooter scenario was higher for 28 of the 29 institutions than for the percentage
who indicated that they participate in annual training. There are four institutions who
responded at least 97% consistently to the institutional responsibility questions; however,
these respondents indicated that they do not participate in annual training.
Figure 8 indicates that 13 institutions reported consistency in response to at least
75% of the personal responsibility questions for the hostage scenario. All 29 institutions
indicated consistency on at least 60% of the personal responsibility questions.
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Figure 8. Mean Percentage of Consistency for the Personal Responsibility Questions for
the Hostage Scenario and Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in Training at
Least Annually by Institution.

Data demonstrated that the level of training provided did not indicate that
personnel will respond more consistently. The mean percentage of consistency in
response for the personal responsibility questions for the hostage scenario was higher for
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27 of the 29 institutions than for the percentage who indicated that they participate in
training at least annually. The three institutions that reported the highest mean
consistency in response to the personal responsibility questions have varied training
participation rates. Institution #15, for example, had 100% mean consistency in response
to the personal responsibility questions; however, only 50% of the respondents indicated
that they participate in training at least annually. Institution #9 had 87% consistency in
response with a higher level of participation in training at 67%. Institution #18 responded
85% consistently on the personal responsibility questions but only 25% of the
respondents indicated participation in annual training.
Thirteen of the 29 institutions reported consensus on all institutional responsibility
questions for the hostage scenario, while 26 of the institutions responded consistently on
at least 90% of the questions (see Figure 9). All institutions responded consistently on at
least 82% of the institutional responsibility questions for the hostage scenario.
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Figure 9. Mean Percentage of Consistency for the Institutional Responsibility Questions
for the Hostage Scenario and Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in Training at
Least Annually by Institution.

83

The level of training provided still did not indicate that personnel will respond
more consistently. The mean percentage of consistency in response for the institutional
responsibility questions for the hostage scenario was higher for 28 of the 29 institutions
than for the percentage that indicated that they participate in training at least annually.
There were four institutions that responded at least 97% consistently to the institutional
responsibility questions; however, the respondents indicated that they do not participate
in training on an annual basis at their institutions.
When reviewing consistency in response to the personal responsibility questions
for the active shooter and hostage scenarios, Institution #15 reported 100% consistency
for both. Overall, most institutions had higher mean consistency rates for the active
shooter scenario as opposed to the hostage scenario as Figure 10 indicates. Additionally,
the level of participation in annual training was much lower than the mean consistency in
response to the personal responsibility questions.
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Figure 10. Mean Percentage of Consistency for all Personal Responsibility Questions and
Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in Training at Least Annually by Institution.
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However, for the institutional responsibility questions, Figure 11 shows that 16
institutions reported the same mean percentage of consistency for both scenarios. Of the
remaining institutions, 11 responded more consistently to the hostage questions than the
active shooter questions. The level of participation in training was much lower than the
mean consistency in response to the institutional responsibility questions. Only one
institution (Institution #12) had participation in training that was comparable to
consistency in response to the institutional responsibility questions.
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Figure 11. Mean Percentage of Consistency for all Institutional Responsibility Questions
and Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in Training at Least Annually by
Institution.

Based on the above information, Null Hypothesis #1 failed to be rejected.
Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency management
plan that includes training did not respond more consistently to potential campus safety
incidents than personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency
management plan that did not include training. Because of the issues discussed earlier
related to rates of response, the fact that this null hypothesis failed to be rejected must be
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seen primarily as an indication that the relationship between training and the consistency
of employee responses to crisis situations may not be related and demands further
investigation.
Null Hypothesis #2
Ho2: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency
management plan that includes training will not respond more accurately to potential
campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions with an allhazards emergency management plan that does not include training.
This hypothesis looked specifically at the accuracy of response to 16 of the
personal responsibility questions for the active shooter and hostage scenarios. Twentyfour institutions included an active shooter situation in their emergency management
plans, while 15 institutions referenced a hostage situation in their plans. This hypothesis
focused exclusively on the personal responsibility questions because the researcher
discovered that many of the emergency management documents did not identify how to
respond to the institutional responsibility questions.
Figure 12 shows that 13 of the 24 institutions responded with at least 85% mean
accuracy to the personal responsibility questions for the active shooter scenario, and 19 of
the 24 institutions responded with at least 75% accuracy. The lowest percentage of mean
accuracy in response to the personal responsibility questions for the active shooter
scenario was 64%.
Data demonstrated that the level of training provided did not indicate that
personnel will respond more accurately. Only Institution #12 reported a higher
percentage of participation in training than the mean percentage of accuracy to the
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personal responsibility questions for the active shooter scenario. Two institutions, #2 and
#4, reported 89% and 93% accuracy, respectively, with no participation in training.
However, the two institutions with the lowest mean percentage of accuracy, #10 and #21,
with 70% and 64% respectively, also indicated no participation in training.
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Figure 12. Mean Percentage of Accuracy for the Personal Responsibility Questions for
the Active Shooter Scenario and Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in Training
at Least Annually by Institution.
Figure 13 indicates a wider range of distribution on mean accuracy in response to
the personal responsibility questions for the hostage scenario. The percentage of mean
accuracy ranged from 50% to 100%. Ten of the 15 institutions responded with at least
75% accuracy.
Participation in training did not indicate that personnel will respond more
accurately to the personal responsibility questions for the hostage scenario. No
institutions indicated a higher percentage of participation in training than the mean
percentage of accuracy to the personal responsibility questions. Institutions #24 and #7
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reported a mean accuracy of 100% and 90% respectively, with only 38% and 20%
participation in annual training. However, Institution #3 only reported a 50% mean
accuracy with 25% participation in annual training. There were also three institutions that
reported 80% mean accuracy with participation in training ranging from 20% to 70%.
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Figure 13. Mean Percentage of Accuracy for the Personal Responsibility Questions for
the Hostage Scenario and Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in Training at
Least Annually by Institution.

These results indicate that Null Hypothesis #2 failed to be rejected. Personnel at
higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency management plan that
includes training did not respond more accurately to potential campus safety incidents
than personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency
management plan that did not include training. Because of the issues discussed earlier
related to rates of response, the fact that this null hypothesis failed to be rejected must be
seen primarily as an indication that the relationship between training and the accuracy of
employee responses to crisis situations may not be related and demands further
investigation.
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Null Hypothesis #3
Ho3: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency
management plan that includes training will not have more knowledge of FERPA
regulations when responding to potential campus safety incidents than personnel at
higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency management plan that does
not include training.
The following tables identify institutions that indicated that they strongly agreed
or agreed that information regarding Dave‟s behavior may be released to: Figure 14,
Dave‟s parents; Figure 15, colleagues; and Figure 16, students, accompanied by rates of
participation in annual training.
Figure 14 indicates that the mean percentage who reported that they strongly
agreed or agreed that information may be released to Dave‟s parents (the correct
response) ranged from 0% to 60%. Only five institutions reported a mean percentage of
50% or above, while 10 institutions indicated a mean percentage of 25% or below.
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Figure 14. Mean Percentage Who Indicated That FERPA Allows Them to Release
Information to Dave‟s Parents and Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in
Training at Least Annually by Institution.
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Eleven of the 29 institutions had a higher percentage of individuals who
participate in annual training than the mean percentage of institutions who strongly
agreed or agreed that information may be released to Dave‟s parents. Chapter 5 further
discusses the significance of this finding since FERPA permits the release of this
information.
The mean percentage who reported that FERPA allowed them to release
information about Dave‟s behavior to their colleagues was higher than the mean
percentage who indicated that they may release information to Dave‟s parents. Figure 15
shows the mean percentage of individuals who strongly agreed or agreed ranged from 0%
to 91%. Twenty-one of the 29 institutions indicated a mean percentage of at least 50%
who strongly agreed or agreed that they may release information to their colleagues; in
this case, the correct response. Two institutions, #13 and #15, both reported that no
information may be released to their colleagues.
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Figure 15. Mean Percentage Who Indicated That FERPA Allows Them to Release
Information to Their Colleagues and Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in
Training at Least Annually by Institution.
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Only seven institutions had a higher percentage of individuals who participate in
annual training than the mean percentage of institutions who strongly agreed or agreed
that information may be released to their colleagues. Chapter 5 further discusses the
significance of this finding since FERPA permits the release of this information.
Figure 16 indicates that a much lower percentage of institutions reported that they
may release information regarding Dave‟s behavior to students. The mean percentage
who responded that they strongly agreed or agreed (the correct response) ranged from 0%
to 43%. Four institutions unanimously agreed that no information may be released to
students, while 11 institutions reported at least 25% agreement that information may be
released.
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Figure 16. Mean Percentage Who Indicated That FERPA Allows Them to Release
Information to Students and Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in Training at
Least Annually by Institution.

This FERPA scenario reports even more inconsistency. Sixteen of the 29
institutions reported a higher level of training participation on an annual basis than the
mean percentage who responded that they strongly agreed or agreed that information
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regarding Dave‟s behavior may be released to students. Since FERPA permits the release
of information, training is not effective in educating administrators, faculty, and staff on
the nuances of FERPA.
The above results indicate that Null Hypothesis #3 failed to be rejected. Based on
the data analyzed, personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards
emergency management plan that includes training did not have more knowledge of
FERPA regulations when responding to potential campus safety incidents than personnel
at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency management plan that did
not include training. Since response rates for each personnel group and institution did not
provide numbers that uniformly yielded statistically reliable data, the failure to reject this
null hypothesis must be seen only as an indication that training is not adequately
preparing employees to understand FERPA requirements, and this question demands
further study.
Null Hypothesis #4
Ho4: There will not be more consistency in response to potential campus safety incidents
by personnel in similar positions at various higher education institutions when the
institutions have all-hazards emergency management plans that include training than
institutions that have all-hazards emergency management plans that do not include
training.
This hypothesis reviewed consistency in response by classification, which
includes administrators, faculty, and staff. Figure 17 indicates that the mean consistency
percentage for each classification was very similar and only varied between 4% and 7%
within each type of question.
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For the personal responsibility, institutional responsibility, and FERPA questions,
administrators, faculty, and staff responded most consistently to the institutional
responsibility questions with mean percentages ranging from 92% to 96%. All three
groups responded least consistently to the FERPA questions with mean percentages
ranging from 60% to 67%. Overall, faculty members reported the highest mean
percentage of consistency for the institutional responsibility and FERPA questions, while
staff members reported the highest mean consistency rate for the personal responsibility
questions.
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Figure 17. Mean Percentage Who Responded Consistently by Classification.

Although faculty members responded most consistently for two of the three types
of questions, Figure 18 reports that faculty responding to the survey indicated
participation in the least amount of training (23%). Administrators indicated the highest
percentage of participation in training at 58% even though their mean consistency
response rates were second on all three types of questions.
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Figure 18. Percentage Who Participate in Annual Training by Classification (includes
strongly agree and agree responses).

The results indicate that based on the data available, Null Hypothesis #4 failed to
be rejected. There was not more consistency in response to potential campus safety
incidents by personnel in similar positions at various higher education institutions when
the institutions have all-hazards emergency management plans that include training than
institutions that have all-hazards emergency management plans that did not include
training. Again, support of this null hypothesis is based on data that were compromised
by a low response rate by one of the employee groups – staff. To be able to conclusively
test this null hypothesis, this study needs to be replicated with data that proportionately
represent the three employee divisions.
Null Hypothesis #5
Ho5: There will not be more knowledge of FERPA regulations when responding to
potential campus safety incidents by personnel in similar positions at various higher
education institutions when the institutions have all-hazards emergency management
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plans that include training than institutions that have all-hazards emergency management
plans that do not include training.
FERPA permits the release of information regarding Dave‟s behavior to his
parents, colleagues, and students. Administrators reported the highest mean percentage of
accuracy for each group of individuals to whom information may be released (see Figure
19). Sixty-nine percent of administrators indicated that they strongly agreed or agreed
that information may be released to Dave‟s parents, 77% responded that information may
be shared with colleagues, and 43% reported that information may be released to
students. Faculty indicated the lowest mean percentage of accuracy for Dave‟s parents,
colleagues, and students, with 13%, 48%, and 10%, respectively.
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Figure 19. FERPA Allows Me to Release Information Regarding Dave's Behavior to the
Following Individuals (includes strongly agree and agree responses).

The data analyzed in this study indicated that participation in training played a
significant role in this hypothesis and resulted in the null hypothesis being rejected. As
Figures 20, 21, and 22 indicate, a higher percentage of administrators participate in
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training as part of their institution‟s emergency management plan, followed by staff, and
then faculty.
As Figure 20 reports, while 69% of administrators indicated that information
regarding Dave‟s behavior may be shared with Dave‟s parents, 61% strongly agreed or
agreed that they participate in training at least annually. Of the 77% who strongly agreed
or agreed that information may be released to their colleagues, 61% participate in training
exercises. Administrators were least likely to release information to students. While 43%
reported that information may be shared with students, 67% reported participation in
annual training.
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Figure 20. Administrators Who Strongly Agree or Agree That FERPA Allows Them to
Release Information Regarding Dave's Behavior to the Following Individuals and
Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in Training at Least Annually.

Figure 21 reports that faculty participate the least in training as part of their
emergency management plan. While 13% indicated that information may be released to
Dave‟s parents, 32% participate in annual training. Faculty respondents were more
comfortable releasing information to colleagues. Of the 48% who would release
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information, only 28% participate in training. Only 10% of faculty strongly agreed or
agreed that they would release information to students; however, 29% participate in
annual training exercises.
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Figure 21. Faculty Who Strongly Agree or Agree That FERPA Allows Them to Release
Information Regarding Dave's Behavior to the Following Individuals and Percentage of
Respondents Who Participate in Training at Least Annually.

Staff members indicated greater participation in training than faculty. Figure 22
indicates that while 58% of staff would release information to Dave‟s parents, 50%
participate in annual training as part of their emergency management plan. Of the 71%
who strongly agreed or agreed that information may be shared with colleagues, 59%
engage in annual training. Staff members were also least likely to release information to
students. While 38% indicated that information may be shared with students, 67%
participate in annual training.
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Figure 22. Staff Who Strongly Agree or Agree That FERPA Allows Them to Release
Information Regarding Dave's Behavior to the Following Individuals and Percentage of
Respondents Who Participate in Training at Least Annually.

Null Hypothesis #5 is rejected. Data indicated that administrators who participate
in annual training as part of their emergency management plans have more knowledge of
FERPA regulations, followed by staff, and then faculty. Therefore, there is more
knowledge of FERPA regulations when responding to potential campus safety incidents
by personnel in similar positions at various higher education institutions when the
institutions have all-hazards emergency management plans that include training than
institutions that have all-hazards emergency management plans that did not include
training. Since the response rate for staff was lower than that desired for valid statistical
analysis, conclusions about staff can only be inferred for this null hypothesis, and further
study is needed to confirm this relationship between training and knowledge about
FERPA.
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Null Hypothesis #6
Ho6: Personnel in administrative positions at higher education institutions will not
respond more accurately to potential campus safety incidents than personnel in nonadministrative positions.
This hypothesis specifically looked at accuracy of response for the personal
responsibility questions by administrators as compared to non-administrators (faculty and
staff). For the active shooter scenario, responses for 21 institutions are displayed. For the
hostage scenario, responses for 15 institutions are presented. The numbers vary based on
the number of plans available that addressed the specific scenarios. Additionally, there
may not have been any administrators who completed the survey at some of the
participating institutions.
Figure 23 shows that for the active shooter scenario, administrators responded
more accurately at 10 institutions, while non-administrators responded more accurately
at the remaining 11 institutions. The mean percentage of accuracy for administrators
ranged from 57% to 100%. Administrators at 14 institutions reported a mean percentage
of accuracy of at least 80% for the active shooter scenario. For non-administrators, the
mean percentage ranged from 64% to 94%. Non-administrators at 15 institutions reported
a mean percentage of accuracy of at least 80%. The smallest variation between
administrators and non-administrators at one institution was 1%, while the largest
difference was 20%.
Figure 24 identifies the mean percentage of accuracy for the hostage scenario for
administrators and non-administrators. Administrators responded with the highest mean
percentage of accuracy at five institutions, non-administrators reported the highest mean
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percentage of accuracy at nine institutions, and at one institution, administrators and nonadministrators tied with 100% accuracy on all questions. The mean percentage of
accuracy ranged from 25% to 100% for administrators and from 42% to 100% for nonadministrators. Administrators at five institutions responded with at least 80% mean
accuracy for the hostage scenario, while non-administrators at seven institutions reported
at least 80% mean accuracy.
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Figure 23. Mean Percentage of Accuracy for the Active Shooter Scenario by
Classification.
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Based on the findings, Null Hypothesis #6 failed to be rejected. Personnel in
administrative positions at higher education institutions did not respond more accurately
to potential campus safety incidents than personnel in non-administrative positions.
Response rates by administrators in this study and by institution were such that this
statistical analysis can be viewed as valid.
Comments Received About Research
The researcher received a variety of comments from both respondents and
non-respondents regarding her study. The topic of campus safety causes concern for
some individuals and institutions and clearly limited the individuals who were willing
to participate. For example, one employee who was on the request list felt it was
inappropriate for him as the Campus Police Chief to complete the survey because his
institution is not fully prepared to deal with the types of scenarios presented in the survey.
Another respondent indicated that she completed the survey but struggled because her
institution does not have an emergency management plan in place. A third noted that
closed-ended questions made it difficult to respond to some questions and that openended responses would have been helpful. One respondent expressed concern about how
the questions were worded and how the data would be used. He indicated that there are
many variables associated with each type of incident and that situational factors may
dictate how to respond. Also, one individual asked to be removed from the study. Nine
individuals who were invited to participate asked the researcher if the survey was
intended for him/her and/or alerted the researcher that they had forwarded the survey to
another individual who was more knowledgeable. One respondent indicated that
originally he was not sure if he qualified to complete the survey.
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Additionally, three respondents expressed some confusion about the wording of
the FERPA questions, specifically if the researcher was referring to Dave‟s behavior as in
the moment of the violent incidents vs. generally before or after an incident occurred.
Another respondent noted that there were no questions about behavioral intervention
teams included in the survey. As noted in Chapter 3, four institutions chose not to
participate in this study. One institution advised that they were in the process of
reviewing their emergency management plan and would not be good research subjects.
Another institution indicated that they were uncomfortable with the content of the
questions and how it relates to identifying readiness to respond to campus violence. A
third institution advised that their schedule would not allow participation. The final
institution would not provide a reason for declining to participate.
The researcher also received several favorable comments about her research.
Many individuals expressed interest in the study and its findings and look forward to
reading the results of this survey or listening to a presentation of the results.
Summary
This chapter provided a detailed description of the participants in this research
study, a review of the survey instrument and its internal reliability, and how the
researcher dealt with missing data. The General Linear Model – multivariate analysis
with multiple criterion variables was used to analyze data and identify relationships
between dependent and/or independent variables. Crosstabulations and case summaries
were analyzed to decide whether to reject or fail to reject the null hypotheses. Based upon
these data:
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Ho1: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency
management plan that includes training will not respond more consistently to potential
campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions with an allhazards emergency management plan that does not include training. Failed to be
rejected.
Ho2: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency
management plan that includes training will not respond more accurately to potential
campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions with an allhazards emergency management plan that does not include training. Failed to be
rejected.
Ho3: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency
management plan that includes training will not have more knowledge of FERPA
regulations when responding to potential campus safety incidents than personnel at
higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency management plan that does
not include training. Failed to be rejected.
Ho4: There will not be more consistency in response to potential campus safety incidents
by personnel in similar positions at various higher education institutions when the
institutions have all-hazards emergency management plans that include training than
institutions that have all-hazards emergency management plans that do not include
training. Failed to be rejected.
Ho5: There will not be more knowledge of FERPA regulations when responding to
potential campus safety incidents by personnel in similar positions at various higher
education institutions when the institutions have all-hazards emergency management

103

plans that include training than institutions that have all-hazards emergency management
plans that do not include training. Rejected.
Ho6: Personnel in administrative positions at higher education institutions will not
respond more accurately to potential campus safety incidents than personnel in nonadministrative positions. Failed to be rejected.
Because response rates by both employee groups and institutions were too low in
some cases to allow for full statistical validity, the failure to reject Null Hypothesis #1
through #4 cannot be viewed as definite evidence that the null hypotheses are true. Nor
can Hypothesis #5 be viewed as definitely false. The study does provide evidence,
however, that there is a questionable relationship between training and employee
knowledge of all-hazards emergency management plans, and additional research is
needed to determine if training, as now provided, is of any value.
Chapter 5 summarizes and analyzes the results of this research, provides
recommendations to institutions and other stakeholders about emergency management
planning, and suggests additional research that could expand on or clarify these findings.
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of this research study, including a brief
summary, purpose statement, statement of the problem, null hypotheses, and
methodology. The major findings from the research are presented and analyzed,
including a discussion of uncontrolled variables and limitations, followed by conclusions
and recommendations for future research.
Summary of the Study
Campus violence is a reality to institutions of higher education. The days of
feeling completely safe and secure while attending a college or university no longer exist.
Many campus violence incidents have occurred over the past 50 years, most notably the
Virginia Tech tragedy in 2007 where 32 students and faculty lost their lives in the
nation‟s worst mass shooting. These campus violence incidents brought to light a number
of concerns related to campus safety and emergency preparedness, including concerns
about comprehensive training for faculty, staff, and students and adherence to privacy
laws. This research study focused on the preparedness level of administrators, faculty,
and staff at public higher education institutions in Missouri to respond to potential
campus safety incidents.
Purpose Statement
This research study reported the relationship between active faculty/staff
participation in training exercises as part of implementation of an all-hazards emergency
management plan and the consistency and accuracy of response to potential campus
safety incidents in higher education. The study also identified the relationship between
implementation of an all-hazards emergency management plan that includes faculty/staff
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participation in training exercises and knowledge of the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act (FERPA) regulations when responding to potential campus safety incidents
in higher education.
The purpose of this study was to provide research that allows colleges and
universities to determine if training is effective, and if employees who say they have been
trained actually indicate that they know the institution‟s emergency management plan and
would respond appropriately when presented with potential campus safety incidents. The
findings of this study reform the discussion related to the effectiveness of planning and
training in preparing a college community for a violent situation. The findings also enable
the researcher to make more general observations about the state of emergency
management planning among institutions of higher education, based upon the wide
variations in sophistication and complexity of the plans studied. It is important to note
that due to low response rates in some cases, some of the findings, especially related to
training, may not be representative of the institution as a whole.
Statement of the Problem
Virtually everyone working in higher education today is aware of the potentiality
of a violent campus incident, and most institutions now have an all-hazards emergency
management plan in place. Yet little research has been performed that examines the
amount of training college employees receive related to the plans, the degree of
understanding faculty and staff have of the requirements of the plans, and the consistency
with which they are understood across campus. Since a plan is no better than an
institution‟s ability to implement it, a plan that is poorly or inconsistently understood will
have limited value in case of a campus emergency. Research is critically needed to
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determine how well the myriad of all-hazards emergency management plans have been
assimilated into the culture of the institutions they are designed to protect.
Null Hypotheses
The following null hypotheses were used to guide this research study.
Ho1: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency
management plan that includes training will not respond more consistently to
potential campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions
with an all-hazards emergency management plan that does not include training.
Ho2: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency
management plan that includes training will not respond more accurately to
potential campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions
with an all-hazards emergency management plan that does not include training.
Ho3: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency
management plan that includes training will not have more knowledge of FERPA
regulations when responding to potential campus safety incidents than personnel
at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency management plan
that does not include training.
Ho4: There will not be more consistency in response to potential campus safety
incidents by personnel in similar positions at various higher education institutions
when the institutions have all-hazards emergency management plans that include
training than institutions that have all-hazards emergency management plans that
do not include training.
Ho5: There will not be more knowledge of FERPA regulations when responding
to potential campus safety incidents by personnel in similar positions at various
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higher education institutions when the institutions have all-hazards emergency
management plans that include training than institutions that have all-hazards
emergency management plans that do not include training.
Ho6: Personnel in administrative positions at higher education institutions will not
respond more accurately to potential campus safety incidents than personnel in
non-administrative positions.
Methodology
The participants in this research study were selected from public two-year and
four-year colleges and universities in Missouri. The researcher selected participants who
should be directly involved and have knowledge of their institution‟s all-hazards
emergency management plan. Participants included the following from each college or
university, assuming the institution has the position: president, chief academic officer,
dean of student services/student affairs, registrar, faculty members, public safety
director/chief of police, public safety officer, health/mental health professional, human
resource director, housing director, and emergency preparedness contact person.
A web-based survey, designed by the researcher, was used to collect data. The
survey included two scenarios, each followed by a series of statements related to personal
and institutional responsibility. The two scenarios presented to participants were as
follows:
Scenario #1: Dave, a student, brings a gun to school and is seen with the weapon
on campus. As Brian, another student, is telling you that Dave has a gun, you hear
what sounds like shots fired in an adjoining hallway in your building.
Scenario #2: Situation escalates. Dave takes a classroom of students and their
instructor hostage.
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After the second scenario was presented, the survey included statements regarding federal
regulations for which respondents were asked to indicate levels of agreement.
Participants were also asked to respond to general statements regarding personal and
institutional practices related to all-hazards emergency management planning and
training. Participants were requested to answer the survey without referencing their
institution‟s emergency management plan. The study utilized a five-point Likert scale,
with responses ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The instrument also
collected demographic information related to each participant and took approximately 10
minutes for participants to complete.
From the beginning of this study, the researcher consulted with Missouri‟s
Commissioner of Higher Education and the Higher Education Subcommittee of the
Homeland Security Advisory Council. On behalf of the Higher Education Subcommittee,
the Commissioner agreed to write a letter of support for this study (see Appendix B)
which was provided as a link in the e-mail that was sent from the researcher to each
administrator, faculty, or staff member asking for his/her participation. This letter
encouraged a higher response rate than might be expected without this endorsement and
request, especially from administrators.
The study employed a quantitative research design, with the dependent variables
including the responses to each of the personal responsibility, institutional responsibility,
and FERPA questions. These responses assisted in identifying the consistency of
response to potential campus safety incidents, accuracy of response to potential campus
safety incidents, and knowledge level of FERPA regulations. The independent variables
included responses to the emergency management planning and training questions as well
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as various demographic factors including position, classification of position, status as
emergency management coordinator at his/her institution, employment at a two-year or
four-year institution, name of institution, number of years in current position, number of
years in profession, highest degree earned, gender, and age.
The General Linear Model (GLM) – multivariate analysis with multiple criterion
variables was used to analyze data and served to identify what independent variables
were significant in the presence of all dependent variables. Additionally, this statistical
tool allowed the researcher to use between-subjects effects to determine if a relationship
existed between the dependent variables and each of the significant independent
variables. Data were also analyzed using crosstabulations and case summaries.
Crosstabulations were used to identify relationships between dependent variables and/or
independent variables. For example, crosstabulations were used to determine consistency
in response for all personal responsibility, institutional responsibility, and FERPA
questions by institution and by classification. Crosstabulations also served to identify
how institutions responded to various demographic and emergency management
independent variables. The study utilized case summaries to identify the accuracy in
response for the personal responsibility and FERPA questions by institution and by
classification within institution.
Summary of the Major Findings
This research addressed significant gaps in the literature; first by indicating how
well emergency management plans are understood and can be followed at colleges and
universities when presented with potential campus safety incidents, and second by
addressing how well employees are educated in the nuances of FERPA when considering
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incidents of campus violence. Following is a summary of the major findings of this
research study.
Emergency Management Plans
The literature stresses the importance of having a comprehensive emergency
management plan that includes clear and consistent guidelines (Rollo and Zdziarski,
2007). One of the criticisms of Virginia Tech was that their institution‟s emergency
management plan did not include response to an active shooter situation (Virginia Tech
Review Panel, 2007). This research study demonstrated that by standards recommended
following the Virginia Tech incident, not all emergency management plans are
comprehensive in Missouri, and employees at even fewer colleges are aware of the
degree of instruction provided by their plans. The researcher discovered that of the 27
emergency management plans reviewed, 89% included information on how to respond to
an active shooter situation, while 56% of plans addressed a hostage situation. However,
participants were not very knowledgeable about these inclusions, especially the hostage
situation, and some indicated that their plan included response to a campus violence
situation when in actuality, it did not. Seventy percent of respondents were at least 50%
accurate regarding the inclusion of an active shooter situation in their emergency
management plan, and only 37% were at least 50% accurate regarding the inclusion of a
hostage situation. Therefore, many respondents were not aware of what information is
included in their institution‟s emergency management plan. Additionally, the researcher
found little information pertaining to institutional responsibilities in the event of a
campus safety incident. Few plans addressed the proper protocol for communication and
lockdown procedures when a campus safety incident occurs.
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In addition to the lack of comprehensiveness of emergency management plans,
there were inconsistencies in the plans. A variety of emergency management guidelines
existed for both community colleges and four-year colleges and universities in the state,
including full-scale plans, brochures, quick reference guides, flip charts, and
informational web pages. The documents ranged from one page to over 40 pages and
were referred to by various names, including emergency management plans, emergency
action plans, emergency operations plans, emergency response plans, emergency
response guides, campus emergency preparedness guides, emergency procedures, and
crisis management plans. With this broad variation in the comprehensiveness of planning
documents and because emergency management plans are specifically designed for each
institution, a set of best practices for plans could prove very beneficial for our higher
education institutions.
To be fully effective, an emergency management plan needs to be shared with all
employees at a higher education institution. Data showed that 18% of respondents
indicated that they were not aware that their institution had an emergency management
plan.
While most emergency management plans appear to have been updated since the
Virginia Tech shootings, the researcher discovered that some plans were very outdated.
Three plans in particular caught the researcher‟s attention. In addition to lacking
comprehensiveness, the first plan did not specifically address how to respond to various
types of crisis situations. General information was included in the plan which was
expected to apply to the many types of incidents that may occur on a college campus.
Since each crisis has different requirements and needs, the researcher finds it very
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difficult to use a “one size fits all approach” with emergency management planning. The
next two plans provided sufficient detail on how to respond to various crisis situations
such as fires, tornados, etc. However, there was no direction on how to respond to any
type of campus violence incident. As prevalent as campus shootings have been over the
last few years, it was very surprising that plans have not been updated to include
guidance for responding to this potentially life-saving type of crisis situation.
Training
The U.S. Department of Education (2007) stressed the importance of training in
order to successfully implement an emergency management plan. The literature indicated
that training was occurring more frequently since the Virginia Tech tragedy (Kennedy,
2008). However, participants in this research did not agree. The data indicated there was
a lack of training that occurs at the public higher education institutions in Missouri. Only
35% of participants strongly agreed or agreed that they participate in training and/or drills
related to campus violence incidents at least annually. Administrators indicated the
greatest participation in training, followed by staff, and then faculty who indicated
participation in the least amount of training.
Data indicated that mandatory training related to campus violence occurs on a
limited basis; however, it occurs more frequently for full-time employees than part-time
employees. Respondents reported that 37% of administrators, 27% of full-time staff, and
26% of full-time faculty participate in mandatory training, while only 17% of part-time
staff, 15% of part-time faculty, and 14% of student workers participate in mandatory
training.
The premise of this study was that institutions that participate in training exercises
as part of their emergency management plan will be better prepared to respond to campus
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violence incidents. The data reported that participation in training did not indicate that an
institution was better prepared to respond to potential campus safety incidents. Five of the
six hypotheses in this research suggested that training will result in more consistency and
accuracy of response as well as greater knowledge of FERPA regulations, yet the
following review of hypotheses indicates that only one of the null hypotheses was
rejected.
Null Hypothesis #1
Ho1: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency
management plan that includes training will not respond more consistently to potential
campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions with an allhazards emergency management plan that does not include training.
The data from this study supported this null hypothesis. Overall, there was a
higher percentage of consistency in response to the institutional responsibility questions
than to the personal responsibility questions for the active shooter and the hostage
scenarios, even though many of the emergency management plans did not address the
institutional responsibility questions. For both the active shooter and hostage scenarios,
the mean percentage of consistency for the institutional responsibility questions ranged
from 82% to 100% with a mean of 95% for the active shooter scenario and a mean of
96% for the hostage scenario. This was much higher than the mean percentage of
consistency for the personal responsibility questions, which ranged from 71% to 100%
for the active shooter scenario with a mean of 83% and from 60% to 100% for the
hostage scenario with a mean of 75%.
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Without further study, the researcher can only speculate as to why consistency of
response to institutional responsibility questions was so high among employees whose
plans did not address these circumstances. One possibility is that the institutional
responsibility questions may be less controversial and less prone to uncertainty. It may be
simpler to determine how the institution as a whole should respond than to determine
what any specific individual should do. It may also be the case that exposure to the
significant media coverage given to incidents such as the Virginia Tech shootings has
provided a de facto „universal‟ training for the public as to how institutions should
respond in this type of crisis. A third possibility is that training is occurring in formats
other than through on-campus programs, such as statewide or national workshops or
through publications read by employees – both training measures that this study did not
evaluate.
Based on participant responses, participation in training provided through the
emergency management plan did not affect the consistency of response for the active
shooter and hostage scenarios in this study. There was much variation when reviewing
the level of training that participants indicated they received and the consistency of
response. For example, 18 of the 29 institutions reported at least an 80% mean percentage
of consistency on the personal responsibility questions for the active shooter scenario.
However, participants at 11 of the 18 institutions indicated that only 30% or fewer
participate in training exercises related to campus violence at least annually. The hostage
scenario presented the same picture. While 13 institutions reported at least a 75% mean
percentage of consistency on the personal responsibility questions, seven of these
institutions indicated that 25% or fewer participate in training.
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Based on the above results, Null Hypothesis #1 failed to be rejected. Personnel at
higher education institutions in Missouri with an all-hazards emergency management
plan that includes training did not respond more consistently to potential campus safety
incidents than personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency
management plan that did not include training. Although mean consistency rates were at
least 75% for both scenarios, further research should be conducted with more
representative rates of participation in institutional training to re-evaluate the impact of
training on consistency of response to potential campus safety incidents at higher
education institutions.
Null Hypothesis #2
Ho2: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency
management plan that includes training will not respond more accurately to potential
campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions with an allhazards emergency management plan that does not include training.
Accuracy of response focused exclusively on the personal responsibility questions
since most plans did not include information about institutional responsibility and was
slightly higher for the active shooter scenario than the hostage scenario. The mean
percentage of accuracy for the active shooter scenario ranged from 64% to 93% with a
mean of 79%. The mean percentage of accuracy for the hostage scenario ranged from
50% to 100% with a mean of 76%. A plausible explanation for greater accuracy in
response is that more emergency management plans addressed an active shooter situation
than a hostage situation. Here again, it is also possible that a universal training
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phenomenon has occurred through public discussion about high profile campus shooting
incidents, while less has been written and discussed in the media about hostage situations.
Based on participant responses, participation in training did not indicate that
personnel will respond more accurately to the active shooter or hostage scenarios. Two
institutions with a high mean percentage (93% and 89%) of accuracy and two institutions
with the lowest mean percentage (70% and 64%) of accuracy for the active shooter
scenario all indicated no participation in training exercises. There was as much variation
for the hostage scenario. While one institution indicated a 92% mean accuracy with 67%
participation in training, another institution reported a 90% mean accuracy with 20%
participation in training. The one institution that indicated 100% accuracy in response
only reported 38% participation in training.
Based on the above results, Null Hypothesis #2 failed to be rejected. Personnel at
higher education institutions in Missouri with an all-hazards emergency management
plan that includes training did not respond more accurately to potential campus safety
incidents than personnel at institutions with an all-hazards emergency management plan
that did not include training. Although mean accuracy rates were at least 75% for both
scenarios, further research should be conducted with more representative rates of
participation in institutional training to re-evaluate the impact of training on accuracy of
response to potential campus safety incidents at higher education institutions.
Null Hypothesis #3
Ho3: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency
management plan that includes training will not have more knowledge of FERPA
regulations when responding to potential campus safety incidents than personnel at
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higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency management plan that does
not include training.
The Virginia Tech tragedy demonstrated that FERPA was not well understood
across campus. Faculty members did not share information about their concerns with
Cho‟s behavior with his parents or their colleagues (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007).
The Virginia Tech Review Panel (2007) stated “Information privacy laws are intended to
strike a balance between protecting privacy and allowing information sharing that is
necessary or desirable. Because of this difficult balance, the laws are often complex and
hard to understand” (p. 63). The Review Panel expressed concern about the lack of
understanding of FERPA and the inconsistent practice when applying privacy laws.
FERPA causes much concern for employees of higher education institutions who
feel vulnerable to public sanction if they release information concerning students in
violation of federal law. This research showed that many individuals are still unfamiliar
with the provisions of FERPA and what information may be released. The questions in
this research asked if information regarding Dave‟s behavior may be released to his
parents, to colleagues, and to students. In all cases, the answer is yes. Behavior that is
observed and not part of a student‟s educational record may be released. As stated by the
Virginia Tech Review Panel (2007):
Nothing in FERPA prohibits a school official from sharing with parents
information that is based on that official‟s personal knowledge or observation and
that is not based on information contained in an education record. Therefore,
FERPA would not prohibit a teacher or other school official from letting a parent
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know of their concern about their son or daughter that is based on their personal
knowledge or observation. (p. H-7)
Furthermore, if a situation rises to the level of an emergency that impacts the health
and/or safety of faculty, staff, or students, FERPA allows the release of confidential
information from a student‟s educational record (FERPA, 2008). The Virginia Tech
Review Panel proposed that additional flexibility and clarification be allowed with the
emergency exception of FERPA. In January of 2009, the Department of Education
updated FERPA regulations in an effort to provide more definitive language as to when
an institution may release confidential student information. A small portion of the
updated regulations follows:
An educational agency or institution may take into account the totality of the
circumstances pertaining to a threat to the health or safety of a student or other
individuals. If the educational agency or institution determines that there is an
articulable and significant threat to the health or safety of a student or other
individuals, it may disclose information from education records to any person
whose knowledge of the information is necessary to protect the health or safety of
the student or other individuals. (FERPA, 2008, p. 74854)
Even though FERPA regulations have been updated to provide more guidance,
employees are still uncomfortable with the ambiguity of FERPA and are very hesitant to
release information. This research demonstrated this finding. Participants were not
comfortable releasing information regarding Dave‟s behavior to his parents, to
colleagues, and to students. Although mean percentages were low, participants were most
comfortable releasing information to their colleagues (56%), followed by Dave‟s parents
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(31%), and then students (20%). This hesitation may well be a reflection of the constant
emphasis that is placed by higher education institutions on student privacy, with a general
proviso that the law is less restrictive when it comes to sharing information within the
academic setting for legitimate educational purposes. Respondents would therefore be
more inclined to feel that information could be shared with colleagues.
Based on participant responses, participation in training did not indicate that
personnel will have more knowledge of FERPA regulations. Although training
participation levels ranged from 0% to 100%, there was much inconsistency in response.
The one institution that indicated 100% participation in training was most likely to
release information regarding Dave‟s behavior to colleagues (60%), followed by students
(20%), and then parents (0%). Another institution reported 79% participation in training
and had much higher percentages that were willing to release information, with 73%
indicating that they would release information concerning Dave‟s behavior to their
colleagues, 60% to Dave‟s parents, followed by 40% who would release information to
students. An institution with 71% participation in training had 57% agreement to release
information to colleagues, followed by 43% who would release information to Dave‟s
parents and to students.
There were also five institutions where respondents reported no participation in
training. At four of the five institutions, respondents were much more willing to release
information to their colleagues with percentages of agreement ranging from 56% to 83%.
At three of the five institutions, participants were more likely to release information to
Dave‟s parents than to students, where percentages ranged from 29% to 40%. In
summary, while there was most agreement that information regarding Dave‟s behavior
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may be released to colleagues, there was still not consensus that FERPA permits this
release of information, and training showed no effect on correct response.
Based on the above results, Null Hypothesis #3 failed to be rejected. Personnel at
higher education institutions in Missouri with an all-hazards emergency management
plan that includes training did not have more knowledge of FERPA regulations when
responding to potential campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education
institutions with an all-hazards emergency management plan that did not include training.
Many college employees receive some training related to FERPA from college colloquia,
from professional meetings, and from publications related to their disciplines. It is quite
possible that this training which emphasizes caution in releasing student information to
anyone is generalized by employees to include crisis situations. Further research should
be conducted with more representative rates of participation in institutional training to
re-evaluate the impact of training on knowledge of FERPA regulations when responding
to potential campus safety incidents at higher education institutions.
Null Hypothesis #4
Ho4: There will not be more consistency in response to potential campus safety incidents
by personnel in similar positions at various higher education institutions when the
institutions have all-hazards emergency management plans that include training than
institutions that have all-hazards emergency management plans that do not include
training.
Overall, faculty in the study provided the most consistent responses; however,
they reported the least amount of training at 23%. Administrators indicated the greatest
participation in training at 58% but did not respond most consistently on any category of
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the questions. When looking specifically at personal responsibility, institutional
responsibility, and FERPA questions by classification, all responses in each group of
questions did not differ by more than 7%. For the personal responsibility questions, mean
responses ranged from 78% to 82% with staff reporting the greatest consistency. Faculty
reported the highest mean consistency for the institutional responsibility questions with
responses ranging from 92% to 96%. For the FERPA questions, mean responses ranged
from 60% to 67% with faculty, once again, reporting the greatest consistency.
Based on the above results, Null Hypothesis #4 failed to be rejected. There was
not more consistency in response to potential campus safety incidents by personnel in
similar positions at various higher education institutions in Missouri when the institutions
have all-hazards emergency management plans that include training than institutions that
have all-hazards emergency management plans that did not include training. Further
research should be conducted with more representative rates of participation in
institutional training to re-evaluate the impact of training on consistency of response
among personnel in similar positions at various higher education institutions.
Null Hypothesis #5
Ho5: There will not be more knowledge of FERPA regulations when responding to
potential campus safety incidents by personnel in similar positions at various higher
education institutions when the institutions have all-hazards emergency management
plans that include training than institutions that have all-hazards emergency management
plans that do not include training.
Administrators responding to the survey had the greatest knowledge of FERPA
regulations and reported the greatest participation in training (58%) as part of their
emergency management plan. Seventy-seven percent of administrators agreed that
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information regarding Dave‟s behavior may be released to their colleagues, followed by
69% who agreed that information may be shared with Dave‟s parents, and 43% who
indicated that information may be released to students. Staff members indicated the
second highest participation in annual training (50%) and also reported the second
greatest level of knowledge of FERPA regulations. Seventy-one percent of staff members
indicated that information regarding Dave‟s behavior may be shared with their
colleagues, followed by Dave‟s parents at 58%, and then students at 38%. Faculty
members reported the least agreement that information regarding Dave‟s behavior may
be released and also indicated the lowest level of participation in training (23%). While
48% of faculty members indicated agreement that they may release information to their
colleagues, only 13% indicated agreement to release information to Dave‟s parents,
followed by 10% to students.
Based on the above results, Null Hypothesis #5 is rejected. There is more
knowledge of FERPA regulations when responding to potential campus safety incidents
by personnel in similar positions at various higher education institutions in Missouri
when the institutions have all-hazards emergency management plans that include training
than at institutions that have all-hazards emergency management plans that did not
include training.
Based on participant responses, the findings discussed above indicate that training
does not increase the consistency or accuracy of responses to questions concerning how
an individual or institution should respond to a campus crisis situation. However,
research results in this study do support the value of training in informing employees
about FERPA. These results suggest that colleges and universities should commence
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and/or update training programs related to FERPA at their respective institutions as soon
as possible and should require this training of all faculty and staff.
Null Hypothesis #6
Ho6: Personnel in administrative positions at higher education institutions will not
respond more accurately to potential campus safety incidents than personnel in nonadministrative positions.
Overall, non-administrators responded more accurately to questions concerning a
potential campus safety incident than did administrators. For the active shooter scenario,
administrators responded more accurately at 10 institutions, while non-administrators
responded more accurately at 11 institutions. Accuracy for administrators ranged from
57% to 100%, while accuracy for non-administrators ranged from 64% to 94%. For the
hostage scenario, non-administrators responded more accurately at nine institutions,
while administrators responded more accurately at five institutions. Administrators and
non-administrators both reported 100% accuracy on all personal responsibility questions
at one institution. Accuracy ranged from 25% to 100% for administrators and from 42%
to 100% for non-administrators.
Based on the above results, Null Hypothesis #6 failed to be rejected. Personnel in
administrative positions at higher education institutions in Missouri did not respond more
accurately to potential campus safety incidents than personnel in non-administrative
positions. Since the response rate by administrators was 75% in this study, the researcher
is confident in the statistical validity of this analysis. Further research should be
conducted to determine what interventions can ensure that all personnel are responding
accurately to potential campus safety incidents.
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Uncontrolled Variables and Limitations
There were several variables that were not under the control of the researcher
during this study, and there was no way to know the exact impact that these variables had
on the study. It is believed, however, that the results have not been altered significantly.
Following is a list of these variables.
1. There was no mechanism to control if participants referenced their
institution‟s emergency management plan when responding to the survey.
This could have affected the percentage of accurate responses to the personal
responsibility questions.
2. There was a much higher percentage of administrators who completed the
survey than faculty and staff. Since administrators, faculty, and staff were not
required to participate in the study, the voluntary nature of response resulted
in limited responses by staff in particular and uneven responses by institution.
3. The number of community colleges participating in this research study was
larger than the number of public four-year colleges and universities. However,
there are more community colleges in Missouri than public four-year
institutions.
4. The number of faculty who participated was much greater from community
colleges than from four-year institutions.
5. Some institutions either requested or volunteered to encourage participation in
this study, while others did not.
6. Although the pilot study did not indicate any confusion with the three FERPA
questions, a few participants expressed concern about these questions after
completing the survey.
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7. This study was limited to Missouri colleges and universities. The results may
not be indicative of the levels of planning or of the effectiveness of training in
other states.
Conclusions
Based on the major findings of this study, a number of conclusions can be drawn
about the state of emergency preparedness of the public higher education institutions in
Missouri. These conclusions are based on the data collected for this research study and
due to response rates being low in some cases, conclusions about training may not be
representative of all institutions across the state of Missouri.
1. While most institutions have emergency management plans in place, these plans
are not well read or understood. Overall, 18% percent of individuals who
responded to this study were not even aware that their institution had an
emergency management plan, and 38% of respondents admitted that they had not
read their institution‟s plan. Many respondents also reported that their institution‟s
plan included an active shooter or hostage situation when in actuality, this
guidance was not provided. Individuals at three institutions reported the inclusion
of an active shooter scenario incorrectly at percentages ranging from 64% to 80%.
Respondents from eight institutions reported agreement of 43% to 70% that their
plan included response to a hostage situation when it did not provide this
guidance.
2. Many emergency management plans are not comprehensive and are inconsistent
across the state of Missouri. The researcher discovered that many types and sizes
of plans exist in Missouri. Plans were as simple as a quick reference guide or
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brochure and as detailed as a full-scale plan and ranged from one to over 40
pages. The content related to campus violence also varied. Three emergency
management plans, or 11%, did not include information on response to an active
shooter situation, while 12 plans, or 44%, did not address a hostage situation.
3. Minimal participation in annual training as part of emergency management
planning occurs at our public higher education institutions in Missouri, especially
for faculty. Thirty-five percent of respondents indicated participation in annual
training related to campus violence incidents. Administrators reported the greatest
participation in training at 58%, followed by staff at 50%, and faculty at 23%.
Respondents also indicated that mandatory training is more likely to occur for
full-time employees (administrators – 37%, staff – 27%, and faculty – 26%) as
opposed to part-time employees (staff – 17%, faculty – 15%, student workers –
14%).
4. Participation in training does not indicate that an institution is better prepared to
respond to campus safety incidents. The hypotheses in this study suggested that
institutions with emergency management plans that include training would
experience more consistency and accuracy of response to potential campus safety
incidents as well as more knowledge of FERPA regulations. However, only one
null hypothesis was rejected. Participation in training as part of an emergency
management plan only affected the knowledge level of FERPA regulations by
personnel in similar positions. Administrators participated in the most annual
training related to campus violence incidents at 58% and indicated the greatest
knowledge of FERPA regulations. Staff members reported the second highest
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participation in annual training at 50% and also indicated the second greatest level
of knowledge of FERPA regulations. Faculty members reported the least
agreement that information may be released and also indicated the lowest level of
participation in training at 23%.
5. Employees do not understand what information may be shared under FERPA as
well as what information is not subject to FERPA regulations. This study
confirmed that personnel in higher education are reluctant to share information for
fear that they will be violating student privacy regulations. Although updated
FERPA regulations provide a greater degree of latitude for releasing confidential
student information in the event that the health or safety of a student or other
individuals is seriously compromised, respondents indicated a concern for
releasing this information. Although limited, respondents were most comfortable
sharing information with their colleagues, followed by Dave‟s parents, and then
students.
6. Some institutions, and some individuals, are hesitant to discuss or evaluate
emergency preparedness in response to campus safety incidents. Four institutions
declined to participate in this study, and one individual asked to be removed from
the study. Upon receipt of the survey, a number of individuals immediately
forwarded the survey to another employee who he/she believed would be more
knowledgeable about campus safety. Additionally, the researcher was unable to
obtain emergency management plans from two institutions. This resistance causes
much concern in an era where emergency preparedness is imperative for all
institutions of higher education.
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Recommendations for Further Research
During the course of analyzing the hypotheses specific to this study, the
researcher discovered additional areas that would complement or further this research on
the emergency preparedness of higher education institutions. Future researchers are
encouraged to review these topics to provide additional insight and guidance into the
increasingly important topic of emergency preparedness in higher education. Specific
suggestions for additional research related to these hypotheses were included at the end
of each hypothesis critique and listed a number of areas in which further research is
needed to determine how college employees learn about crisis response. A number of
other areas of needed research were also discovered and are reviewed below.
1. With emergency management plans as varied and incomplete as many were found
to be, additional research needs to examine why institutions that are aware that
campus violence is a clear and present danger have chosen not to adequately
prepare for such a crisis.
2. A comprehensive review of the differences in emergency preparedness plans
between two-year and four-year public institutions in Missouri could provide
valuable research. There are significant differences between community colleges
and four-year colleges and universities (i.e., admissions requirements, on-campus
housing, large athletic programs, the pressures of upper division and graduate
work) that could affect the preparedness level of these institutions, and it would
be useful to know if these differences are reflected in their plans.
3. A comparison of emergency preparedness planning between public and private
higher education institutions in Missouri would also be useful. The nature of
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public vs. private institutions could significantly impact the preparedness level of
these institutions and what should be included in an effective plan.
4. Colleges and universities increasingly rely on adjunct faculty to teach as well as
part-time staff to provide service. However, these employees are transient, may
only be employed temporarily, and may have the least knowledge of campus
policies and procedures. A survey of these part-time faculty and staff may reveal
valuable data on the preparedness level of these employees.
5. Students are central to safety and security issues in higher education. Surveying
students about how they would respond to potential incidents of campus violence
could also provide useful research. The majority of community college students
are transient, while students at four-year institutions are more likely to be
residential. This variable could definitely impact the preparedness level of
students by campus type and should be examined.
6. All-hazards emergency management planning does not focus solely on campus
violence. Additional research should focus on emergency preparedness for natural
disasters, severe weather, or other types of all-hazards incidents.
7. Since the FERPA questions caused some confusion for a few respondents, these
questions could be rewritten and expanded on to conduct a more detailed review
of the level of understanding of the nuances of FERPA.
8. This study included only Missouri colleges and universities, where emergency
management planning may not be indicative of what is happening elsewhere in
the country. Similar studies should be conducted in other states to determine if
emergency planning is similarly varied.
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Concluding Remarks
This research has been critical in identifying the emergency preparedness levels
of our public higher education institutions in Missouri. While the research showed that
our institutions are prepared to respond to incidents of campus violence to greatly varying
degrees, there are some fundamental steps that can be taken to increase the preparedness
level of our colleges and universities. A set of best practices should be developed for
emergency management plans. The Higher Education Subcommittee of the Homeland
Security Advisory Council could assist in researching and developing these best
practices. Additionally, statewide training exercises could assist with institutions being
uniformly trained to respond to incidents of campus violence. The Higher Education
Subcommittee could coordinate statewide training programs to assist our colleges and
universities with emergency preparedness. These steps alone will assist our institutions in
increasing their preparedness levels to respond to incidents of campus violence.
The researcher undertook this study fully expecting to find that both the
comprehensiveness of plans, and the amount of training required by plans, would have a
significant and measurable effect on how consistently and accurately employees
responded to campus safety incidents. Surprisingly, neither was found to be the case.
Despite low response rates from staff and uneven responses by institution, the researcher
believes that emergency planners in the state would benefit from re-examining how plans
are presented to employees, and how training occurs, to determine how emergency
planning can be made more effective.
The researcher also expected respondents to be much more knowledgeable about
the provisions of FERPA. It was shocking that in these potential crisis situations,
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individuals were reluctant to share information that could help protect the safety of their
colleagues and students. With as much publicity as student privacy regulations have
received over the past few years, the researcher fully believed that employee
understanding of FERPA would have been greater.
It was also disconcerting to learn that some colleges and a number of individuals
did not care to discuss emergency preparedness. This hesitation seems unhealthy in an
environment in which all employees should be fully aware of how both they and their
institutions should respond to a campus crisis situation. Campuses must raise both the
level of discussion and comfort with this topic if personnel are to be adequately prepared
to respond.
On a positive note, individuals showed a surprising degree of intuitive
understanding of how they should respond to a campus violence incident. This may
suggest that there has been increased public awareness and consciousness that serves as
universal training and could be used to enhance this knowledge. This study should be
only the first of many steps to improve emergency preparedness for institutions of higher
education in Missouri and across the United States.
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APPENDIX A
Campus Safety Survey
Please complete this survey without referencing your institution's emergency
management plan.
Scenario #1: Dave, a student, brings a gun to school and is seen with the weapon on
campus. As Brian, another student, is telling you that Dave has a gun, you hear
what sounds like shots fired in an adjoining hallway in your building.
I feel well prepared to respond to this situation.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
As soon as I hear shots fired, I would:
Strongly
Agree
Leave my
office/classroom
to see what was
happening
Lock my
office/classroom
door
Call the
Director of
Public
Safety/Chief
of Police
Call 911
Alert the
campus
community
that there is
an armed person
on campus

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree
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Do nothing
If I learn that someone has been injured by the gunman, I would:
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

Assist the
injured
person
Confront
the gunman
Call the
Director of
Public
Safety/Chief
of Police
Call 911
Alert the
campus
community
that
someone
has been
injured
Do nothing
When my institution is aware that there is a gunman on campus, my institution is
responsible for:
Strongly
Agree
Notifying the
campus
community
Calling 911
Locking down
the campus

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

143

Maintaining
regular
communication
with the
campus
community

When shots have been fired, my institution is responsible for:
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

Notifying the
campus
community
Calling 911
Locking down
the campus
Maintaining
regular
communication
with the
campus
community

Scenario #2: Situation escalates. Dave takes a classroom of students and their
instructor hostage.
I feel well prepared to respond to this situation.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
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If I were taken hostage, I would:
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

Confront
Dave
physically
Confront
Dave
verbally
Try to
establish a
rapport with
Dave
Be
observant
of my
surroundings

When my institution becomes aware that there is a hostage situation on campus, my
institution is responsible for:
Strongly
Agree
Notifying the
campus
community
Calling 911
Locking down
the campus
Maintaining
regular
communication
with the
campus
community

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree
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Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) - Student Privacy Rights
FERPA allows me to release information regarding Dave‟s behavior to his parents.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
FERPA allows me to release information regarding Dave‟s behavior to my colleagues.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
FERPA allows me to release information regarding Dave‟s behavior to students.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
General Questions Regarding Your Institution's Emergency Management Plan
My institution has implemented an emergency management plan.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
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I have read my institution‟s emergency management plan.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
My institution‟s emergency management plan addresses an active shooter situation.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
My institution‟s emergency management plan addresses a hostage situation.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
I was involved in the development of my institution‟s emergency management plan.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
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I participate in training and/or drills related to campus violence (e.g., active shooter
and/or hostage situation) at least annually as part of my institution‟s emergency
management plan.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Participation in training and/or drills related to campus violence (e.g., active shooter
and/or hostage situation) is mandatory for the following at my institution:
Strongly
Agree
Administrators
Full-time
faculty
Part-time
faculty
Full-time staff
Part-time staff
Student
workers

Demographic Questions
Position

Classification
Administrator
Faculty
Staff

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree
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Are you the emergency management coordinator at your institution?
Yes
No
Are you employed at a two-year or four-year institution?
Two-year
Four-year
At which institution are you employed?
Crowder College
East Central College
Jefferson College
Linn State Technical College
Metropolitan Community College-Blue River
Metropolitan Community College-Business and Technology
Metropolitan Community College-Longview
Metropolitan Community College-Maple Woods
Metropolitan Community College-Penn Valley
Mineral Area College
Missouri State University-West Plains
Moberly Area Community College
North Central Missouri College
Ozarks Technical Community College
St. Charles Community College
St. Louis Community College-Florissant Valley
St. Louis Community College-Forest Park
St. Louis Community College-Meramec
St. Louis Community College-Wildwood
State Fair Community College
Three Rivers Community College
Harris-Stowe State University
Lincoln University
Missouri Southern State University
Missouri State University
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Missouri University of Science and Technology
Missouri Western State University
Northwest Missouri State University
Southeast Missouri State University
Truman State University
University of Central Missouri
University of Missouri-Columbia
University of Missouri-St. Louis
University of Missouri-Kansas City
Number of years in current position

Number of years in profession

What is the highest degree you have earned?
Associate's degree
Bachelor's degree
Master's degree
Doctoral degree
None
Gender
Male
Female
Age
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APPENDIX C
Dear Respondent:
I am a doctoral student in the College of Education at the University of Missouri-St.
Louis under the advisement of Dr. Kent Farnsworth (farnsworthk@umsl.edu) and Dr.
Lloyd Richardson (lloyd_richardson@umsl.edu) and need your assistance. I am
conducting a research study on institutional preparedness for campus violence, in
collaboration with the Commissioner of Higher Education and the Higher Education
Subcommittee of the Homeland Security Advisory Council (see attached <a
href="http://vega.jeffco.edu/register/kim/letter_of_support.pdf">letter of support</a>).
The objective of this research is to attempt to understand the preparedness level of faculty
and staff when responding to potential campus safety incidents. Through your
participation, we hope to understand more about how emergency management planning
and training affect the level of preparedness of faculty and staff, and how they can be
made more effective. You have been selected to participate because of your role at the
institution.
Following is a link to a web-based survey. The survey provides two campus safety
scenarios that I think you will find particularly interesting, followed by a series of
questions related to personal and institutional responsibility, as well as knowledge of
student privacy regulations. There are also questions related to emergency management
planning and training at your institution. Additionally, there are a few demographic
questions asked at the end of the survey. The survey will take approximately 10 minutes
to complete.
I will keep all data collected under lock and key. When the results of this survey are
published or discussed with the Commissioner, the Higher Education Subcommittee, or
at conferences, no identifying information will be included. If you choose to participate,
you have the right not to answer any question(s) you do not want to answer. Your
participation will constitute consent to have your responses used in my study in the
aggregated form mentioned, and you may withdraw from participation in this study at
any time.
I hope you will take a few minutes to complete this survey. Each public two-year and
four-year college and university in Missouri is involved, and full participation is needed
to provide a complete picture of emergency readiness in the state. Campus violence is of
growing concern to higher education institutions, and your participation will help identify
the preparedness level of our institutions when responding to potential incidents of
campus violence.
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If you have any questions or concerns about completing the survey or participating in this
study, you may contact me by phone at 636-797-3000, ext. 207, or by e-mail at
kharvey@jeffco.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject,
you may contact the University of Missouri-St. Louis, Office of Research Administration
by mail at 341 Woods Hall, One University Boulevard, St. Louis, MO 63121-4400, by
phone at 314-516-5899, or by e-mail at ora@umsl.edu.
Sincerely,
Kimberly M. Harvey
Registrar
Jefferson College

